Europe's arms race: Shell shortage threatens defense strategy
"It's the economy, stupid!" - the slogan under which American President Bill Clinton rose to power - seems fitting for the governments of European countries, with a slight modification. When Fukuyama's "end of history" turned out to be a mirage of the long-gone 1990s, the continent's secure future may depend on implementing a short plan summed up in two words: "ammunition, stupid!".
The war in Ukraine is consuming ammunition in quantities unimaginable for decades. Although expert analyses, such as forecasts from the American think tank RAND, have long pointed to the risk of a full-scale conflict, the West has almost entirely disarmed itself in the 21st century, building armies more focused on expeditionary operations than on fighting on European territory.
This was facilitated by the fact that armed forces, including those in Poland, became an easy target for budget savings. Cutting costly development programs, research work, or equipment orders was the European norm for years.
The war in Ukraine abruptly reminded Europe of an old principle: "If you want peace, prepare for war" goes the famous Latin phrase. How - in the context of Ukrainian experiences - does Europe's defense capability look?
At least 110,000 shells per month
The war in Ukraine is often called a drone war, but considering the statistics of losses and the nature of the actions, it has become, much like World War I, an artillery war responsible for most of the casualties and equipment losses.
Both sides fire massive numbers of shells every day. For Ukraine, this ranges from 3,000 to 8,000 shells daily. For Russia, which produces about 4 million artillery shells annually, this rate is at least twice as high. According to Ukrainian sources, during the peak of its artillery activity, Russia fired up to 40,000 shells every day.
In recent weeks, the intensity of Russian fire has decreased by half, despite ammunition supplies from North Korea or Iran. As reported earlier this year by the Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces of Ukraine, Gen. Oleksandr Syrskyi, this is the result of effective Ukrainian strikes on the Russian logistical chain, which significantly reduced the amount of ammunition reaching the front.
Meanwhile, Ukraine's demand - assuming the minimum, lower bound of usage - reaches approximately 110,000 artillery shells per month (Ukrainian decision-makers, when presenting the needs of their army, speak of as many as 330,000-660,000 shells per month). Who can produce that much?
Production smaller than demand
Currently, European and NATO capabilities can be estimated based on industry statistics. Before 2022, the United States produced about 14,000 artillery shells of 155 mm caliber monthly.
Even smaller was the scale of production in Europe. Poland, as revealed by a former prime minister, produced only 30,000-40,000 artillery shells per year and relied on imported propellant charges.
The biggest producer of artillery ammunition, Rheinmetall, produced about 70,000 shells annually. Given the scantiness of its stockpiles, Ukraine needed to purchase shells worldwide to provide practical assistance. Thus, an international "ammunition coalition" was necessary to organize.
The West is producing more and more ammunition
At the same time, the West is not ignoring Ukraine's experiences. Rheinmetall alone (the company serves as an example due to available data on production scale) will produce 770,000 shells this year, increasing production tenfold. By 2027, the German company's production lines aim to produce as many as 1.2 million shells annually, with further increases planned up to 1.5 million shells.
The industrial machine in the USA has also been set in motion, and it plans to produce 100,000 shells per month by 2025.
The scale of production is worth comparing to demand. Assuming the cautious adoption of 500 Krab and K9 self-propelled howitzers (the framework agreement from 2022 foresees the purchase of 692 K9 howitzers alone!), firing 30-40 shells daily, a day of combat would mean consumption of even 22,000 shells. This would mean using Poland's annual pre-war production within two days.
Similar analyses conducted for the Bundeswehr were presented in 2022 by Frank Haun, head of the German company KMW, and for the French Air Force by the IFRI institute in 2025. It's essential to note that such calculations carry a very high margin of error and are meant to illustrate the scale of shortages or needs rather than predict how many hours before Europe would have to capitulate.
Especially since the problem of insufficient stockpiles has already been recognized in the West. Production capacities - though not created overnight - are being expanded, and production scales are gradually increasing. Although tanks and howitzers fight on the front lines, the war is primarily a clash of economies. For the West, as long as it does not neglect further strengthening its defensive potential, this is good news.
