Russia's enduring resilience: A costly but sustainable conflict
The war in Ukraine has resulted in significant losses for Russia. However, despite the deaths and wounds numbering in the hundreds of thousands, Russia's mobilization potential is far from depleted. Military expenditures, though high, remain well below the levels that contributed to the fall of the Soviet Union during the Cold War.
How long can Russia sustain such severe losses as during the fighting in Ukraine? From almost the outset of Russian aggression, various analysts have predicted a rapid depletion of Russian forces, an economic collapse, or social unrest driven by the deaths of countless Russians.
Despite experiencing losses unprecedented in Europe since World War II, Russia's army has not only maintained its capacity to continue fighting but has also increased its numbers while improving the quality of its training.
Despite the restrictions caused by sanctions, Russian industry is capable of not only covering current equipment losses but also producing a surplus of weapons for units being trained deep within the country.
Their purpose is unknown. However, forecasts, including those presented by Sky News, suggest the possibility of a significant summer offensive by Russian forces in the Kharkiv region.
Russia sustains losses but develops the army
While these unfavorable reports for the West are publicized by Kremlin propaganda, they are not merely fabrications.
In April 2025, NATO’s Supreme Allied Commander Europe, General Christopher Cavoli, noted that the Russian military no longer shows signs of the collapse it suffered in the latter half of 2022. He pointed out that newly enlisted Russian soldiers are, on average, better trained than their Ukrainian counterparts, and that the fact they join voluntarily—regardless of their individual motivations—has a positive effect on unit morale during combat.
Mobilization potential
Collin Meisel and Mathew Burrows, experts who analyzed Russian potential in a War on the Rocks publication, addressed this issue in the context of failed peace talks.
They noted that Russia has about 19 million men aged 20-39, compared to about 5 million available to Ukraine. This means that Putin can afford losses three times greater and still prevail in a war of attrition.
Although, according to the United Nations Population Fund, Russia's population is slowly decreasing, accelerated by losses in Ukraine, within a decade, Russian reserves of conscription-age men will decrease by 1.22 to 3.58 million. This decrease is insufficient to significantly impact the capabilities of the Russian army.
Social indifference
Russian society, resembling the mindset during Stalin's totalitarian regime, calmly absorbs information about losses that would cause social unrest in any democratic country.
It is worth mentioning that during the decade-long (1979-1989) campaign in Afghanistan, recalled by Russians as a time of great losses, the Soviet army lost 15,000 dead and 35,000 wounded—fewer than some monthly losses Russia suffered in Ukraine.
In the Soviet Union, 15,000 killed led to protests by soldiers' families and the creation of the Committee of Soldiers' Mothers of Russia, which organized open protests and demanded an end to the war. In Putin's Russia, despite significantly larger losses, nothing similar occurs.
Industrial production
Russia's armament production capacity remains a concern for Ukraine and the West. According to the British Ministry of Defense, by 2024, Russia is capable of producing about 100 main battle tanks per month.
Similar estimates were presented by Gen. Christopher Cavoli, who suggested that in 2025, Russian production would total about 1,500 new tanks and 3,000 other armored vehicles. These figures include equipment reintroduced into service from mobilization warehouses.
Although photos of depleted weapon stocks have long been seen as a forewarning of Russian supply issues, Russia still possesses Soviet-era resources that, albeit at increasing costs, can be accessed if necessary.
Divergent forecasts
Although the impact of economic sanctions is evident in select sectors, the Russian defense industry overall continues to show resilience. How long can it maintain its current production levels? Opinions vary on this question.
The war-mode Russian economy supplies necessary equipment to the army, but, as noted years ago by Gen. Dwight Eisenhower, money spent on the military is also money not spent on health, education, and other essentials for every society.
Nevertheless, Mathieu Boulègue of Chatham House (the British Royal Institute of International Affairs) offers a pessimistic outlook for the West. He points out that analysts remain divided over how to interpret Russia’s economic data. Some predict an imminent collapse of the Russian economy that would bring an end to its military aggression, while others argue that Russia, operating in a wartime economy, could sustain its campaign in Ukraine for years and continue to pose a threat to neighboring countries. Notably, Russia’s current military spending still remains well below the levels seen during the Soviet era.
