North Korean artillery boost struggles to aid Russian efforts
North Korea dispatched about 10,000 infantry soldiers from its elite units to the Kursk region, equipped and trained by the Russians. It wasn't until a month of combat and the substantial loss of this corps that Kim Jong Un decided to send them heavy equipment—artillery and self-propelled rocket launchers.
Thus far, Kim's soldiers have struggled on the modern battlefield, which is dominated by drones and radars like the Ukrainian Biskvit-KB or SR Hawk, equipped with an optoelectronic observation head. The North Koreans move as if participating in maneuvers from the "Brotherhood of Arms '70," proceeding across open terrain in columns without the support of infantry fighting vehicles or even artillery. For now, though, artillery support is expected to arrive.
Koksans to the rescue
According to the British newspaper "Financial Times," about 50 Koksans—large-caliber artillery pieces—and approximately 20 multi-launch rocket systems with a caliber of 240 mm on wheeled chassis have been sent to Russia. The arrival of the latter has not yet been confirmed.
Although artillery in the North Korean army stands as an oasis of modernity, it has actually stagnated at the developmental level of the 1970s. The main weapons of the Koreans include the M-20 howitzer, dating back to the 1930s, and the D-74, a slightly newer model produced under license in Korea.
Self-propelled artillery is somewhat more recent, though models M-1991 and M-1992 are merely old howitzers mounted on tracked chassis, often using artillery tractors from the 1950s and 60s. The Juche 107 is relatively modern, utilizing a chassis based on T-72 tanks. However, the Kim regime has dispatched its more specialized armaments to Russia.
In mid-November, a train carrying the self-propelled field gun M-1989 Koksan, with a 170 mm caliber, was spotted in Siberian Krasnoyarsk. According to unofficial information, they have now appeared in western Russia.
Koksan is an entirely North Korean gun project, mounted on the chassis of a Chinese Type 59 tank, a licensed version of the Soviet T-54 tank. The gun boasts a range of up to 25 miles with regular ammunition, increasing to about 37 miles when using rounds with a gas generator. Its rate of fire is not impressive; based on observations from the Iran-Iraq war—during which Koksans were used in combat—it was determined to be only one shot every 2.5 minutes.
Koksan is the North Korean equivalent of Soviet 2S7 Pion guns, with a 203 mm caliber, used by both Russians and Ukrainians to destroy fortification lines—combat bunkers, trenches, rear supply depots, and command posts. When paired with modern reconnaissance tools, a well-functioning communication system, and modern ammunition, they prove to be an effective combat tool.
They are meant to help, but obstacles are piling up
After occupying parts of the Kursk region, the Ukrainians constructed field fortification lines in several areas, which have withstood Russian attacks. Consequently, the Kursk Military Group is not meeting the deadlines set by Vladimir Putin for reclaiming lost territories. The initial deadline passed at the end of September.
Ultimately, after further unsuccessful operations, Putin had to postpone the "final" date for reclaiming the Kursk region to align with the inauguration of President-elect Donald Trump. This was due to concerns that the Americans might push for a ceasefire along the current front line. The loss of part of the territory would be challenging for Kremlin propaganda to explain.
This is likely the main reason why two artillery regiments, each equipped with 36 M-1989 Koksan guns, have appeared in western Russia. Korean equipment is expected to aid the Russians in regaining lost lands. However, there is a problem that may undermine these plans.
The only producer of 170 mm ammunition for Koksans is North Korea, and first, the shells must be transported nearly 4,163 miles. Given the low efficiency of Russian logistics, this could be a considerable challenge. Considering the effectiveness of Ukrainian forces in destroying key ammunition depots, the impact of the new equipment on military operations may not be significant.
The capabilities of the Koksan may also be limited by the training of North Korean soldiers, who have not had the opportunity to work with reconnaissance drones and modern artillery radars. Moreover, they may struggle to protect themselves against these technologies, which, given the low mobility of their chassis, could pose a problem for the users.
