ConflictsNorth Korean troops in Russia: A covert force in plain sight

North Korean troops in Russia: A covert force in plain sight

According to the US Department of State, 10,000 North Korean soldiers have already been stationed in the Kursk Oblast. The Ukrainians themselves claim that Koreans are already fighting against them in the region. For the Russians, they are not a significant reinforcement but are invaluable as a tool for escalating the war.

Kim Jong Un's army is a force, but only on paper.
Kim Jong Un's army is a force, but only on paper.
Images source: © East News | STR

9:31 AM EST, November 10, 2024

The Kremlin initially dismissed reports of North Korean troop deployments as "fake news." However, on October 24, Putin no longer denied the presence of North Korean troops in Russia and stated that it depends on Moscow how to implement the partnership agreement with Pyongyang.

Ukrainian Defense Minister Rustem Umerov stated in an interview with South Korean TV KBS that Kim Jong Un's soldiers have already been deployed to the front. They are reportedly wearing Russian uniforms and pretending to be Buryats, making it difficult to identify the DPRK military personnel.

Initially, there were reports that the Korean dictator had sent special forces to the Russian Federation. However, these are not special forces in the NATO sense, but simply units better trained and equipped than regular units of the North Korean army. They are not even comparable to Russian guard units. Kim's regime has sent shooters to the front—light infantry without heavy equipment.

North Korean underdeveloped infantry

The main force of the North Korean military is the ground troops, which comprise 950,000 soldiers, 5,545 tanks, about 2,500 infantry fighting vehicles, and about 15,000 artillery and rocket systems. This is quite a formidable force on paper, but it is misleading, as it does not reflect its actual combat capabilities.

The main equipment of the infantry includes Kalashnikov rifles, including the archaic Type 56, which has been produced without major changes since 1956. The same applies to their uniforms, which have not changed since the 1960s and do not meet modern battlefield requirements. The soldiers have no ballistic protection and still use wz.40 steel helmets, which are copies of the Soviet Ssh-40 helmet designed just before World War II. Kim Jong Un's forces also lack individual communication means.

The situation is similar to that of infantry support weapons. Still in use are the Degtyaryov hand-held machine guns, whose production ended in the USSR in 1945, or local copies of Soviet PKMs. The heavy machine gun NSW is also in use.

Tank and mechanized units are equally outdated technologically. The main type of tank is the Chonma-ho, in versions 1 to 3, of which the Koreans have about 1,200. These are modeled after the Soviet T-62, whose production ended in the 1980s. Today, this type of tank is still used by 18 countries, including the Russian Federation, which is pulling more units out of storage for use in Ukraine as infantry support vehicles. The Koreans still have about 1,000 original T-62s. The remaining tanks are T-72s or their local variants.

Even worse is the equipment of mechanized units, although North Korea only has trace amounts of these. They mainly have old Chinese VTT-323s and Soviet BMP-1s, which have not been modernized in any way. Their passive protection is at the level of the end of the Cold War, with no active protection.

The artillery also stopped developing at the level of the 1970s. The main weapon is the M-20 howitzer from the 1930s and the slightly newer D-74 from two decades later, produced in North Korea under license.

The oasis of "modernity" is the self-propelled artillery, although the M-1991 and M-1992 models are simply old howitzers mounted on tracked chassis, often artillery tractors from the 1950s and 1960s. The relatively modern Juche 107, whose carrier is based on T-72 tanks, is also in use.

"Russian" Koreans

Due to their allies' equipment, the Russians decided that it would be easier to deploy them to the front and equip them with Russian resources than to bring outdated and worn-out equipment from thousands of miles away. North Korean infantrymen received Russian uniforms and personal soldier gear, making them look like Russian motorized riflemen.

Putin's new soldiers received the latest Kalashnikov factory AK-12 rifles, which have been produced for only a decade. Snipers received semi-automatic sniper rifles SWCh, which entered service a year ago, as well as PKM machine guns, well-known to North Koreans. As something new to them, they received 9K111 Fagot anti-tank guided missiles.

The Koreans sent their best units to Russia, although physically, they differ significantly from their southern neighbors and even from citizens of the Federation from the poorest Caucasian republics. Years of malnutrition and inferior healthcare have resulted in an average height in North Korea of only 5 feet 5 inches and 106 pounds. Meanwhile, the average height of men in the southern part of the peninsula is 5 feet 9 inches, and they have an average weight of 154 pounds.

In published photos from exercises in the Far East, low, skinny soldiers can be seen in oversized Russian uniforms. They are not exactly the world's military elite but rather a cannon fodder similar to what the Kremlin has been sending to the front for months. Little has changed in Kim Jong Un's state, where military nutrition is better than that of civilians.

Observations of the South Korean army also indicate that only a small group of Northern soldiers are prepared for combat operations. The rest are parade-ground soldiers marching before the grandstand, primarily meant to look good on parade grounds.

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