North Korea's military support fuels Russia, worries Seoul

North Korea is tightening its cooperation with the Russian Federation by not only sending soldiers but primarily supplying artillery ammunition and rocket missiles. Just last year, Kim Jong Un's regime delivered 3 million 152 mm shells and about 500,000 122 mm shells to Putin's army.

Russia has also received KN-23 and KN-24 short-range ballistic missiles. The first is heavily based on the Russian Iskander system missiles. The second is reportedly the result of local designers' work, although it has many similarities to the Tochka-U system commonly used by the Russian army.

Both types were tested in 2019, and mass production began three years later. The Russians started attacking targets in Ukraine with them in December 2023. Specialists identified remnants of KN-23 and KN-24 based on parts found after the strikes.

Obvious facts do not prevent Moscow and Pyongyang from denying — even at the UN — that North Korea is arming Russia.

It quickly became apparent that the most commonly used KN-23 missile significantly falls behind even Russian products in terms of quality. In early May, it was reported that the KN-23 has a high failure rate. About half of the North Korean rockets launched lost their programmed trajectory and exploded in the air.

Moreover, the manufacturer tolerates an accuracy error for both missiles of about 295-328 feet, which by modern standards is unacceptable. The Russian Iskander boasts declared accuracy — depending on the version — of 16-98 feet. Similarly, the ATACMS missiles have comparable accuracy. Meanwhile, GMLRS-U missiles have accuracy from 3 to 13 feet.

This means North Korean missiles are not suitable for targeting specific points but only surface targets. In terms of accuracy, they do not differ from American standards from World War II. At that time, Americans considered a bombing accurate if the bomb exploded within 328 feet of the target.

The Russians do not mind the lack of accuracy because North Korean missiles are most frequently used for terrorist attacks against civilian targets in Kharkiv, Kherson, or Zaporizhzhia. It is in these areas that most of the remnants of missiles manufactured in North Korea have been found.

Sam Lair, an adjunct at CNS, one of the world's leading research centers focused on weapons of mass destruction prevention issues, noticed via satellite images that Pyongyang is expanding the factory in Hamhung. It's there that KN-23 and KN-24 missiles are produced. This plant is the only known facility producing solid-fuel ballistic missiles.

The first information emerged in the fall of 2023, when North Korea's state news agency KCNA reported ongoing construction work at the Ryongsong machine complex, showing Kim Jong Un walking around the construction site.

Based on sparse information and KCNA reports, it can be concluded that the work involves the reconstruction of production facilities, as well as the assembly and installation of equipment in machine workshops and the foundry workshop. U.S. analysts estimate that the complex's expansion will increase ballistic missile production by about 40%.

Previously, it was estimated that North Korea could produce up to several hundred KN-23 and KN-24 annually. Given the situation, even increased production won't mean the Russians will flood Ukraine with Kim Jong Un's missiles.

What is troubling, however, is that the regime consistently invests in expanding its defense industry. This is primarily a concern for South Korea and Japan. The funds flowing heavily into Kim's regime allow him to significantly expand his military capabilities. Already, thanks to Kremlin investments, North Korea's Central Military Commission has been able to double the production of artillery ammunition and trucks.

The rapprochement between Russia and North Korea, culminating in the recently ratified strategic partnership agreement covering economic and military areas, worries Seoul. It stipulates, among other things, that the parties pledge mutual military aid in case of aggression against one of them.

Since the beginning of the war in Ukraine, South Korea has declared it would not supply Kyiv with weapons. In the spring of 2023, however, it turned out that South Korean 155 mm shells are being purchased by the U.S. and, via this roundabout way, end up in Ukraine. "The Wall Street Journal" was among the first to report this.

Now, the authorities in Kyiv would like South Korea to sell them more than just shells. This week, Rustem Umerov, Ukraine's defense minister, discussed this issue with South Korea's President Yoon Seok-yeol.

The Koreans agreed to exchange intelligence data about Russian military cooperation with North Korea but refused to sell weapons. According to South Korean SBS television, Kyiv wanted to buy KM-SAM Cheon-gung anti-aircraft missile systems, air defense radar stations, artillery radars, and 155 mm shells.

President Yoon Seok-yeol stated after the meeting that his country may consider providing support "depending on the level of North Korean involvement" on Moscow's side in the war. It was not specified what new developments might lead to such assistance.

Current support for Ukraine includes humanitarian and financial aid. The latter is expected to reach 2.3 billion dollars by the end of the year. Additionally, Seoul offers support in rehabilitating Ukrainian soldiers and rebuilding Ukraine's infrastructure after the war.

The Ukrainian minister's visit changed little. According to the already mentioned SBS television, Korean defense giants — Hanwha and Hyundai Rotem — were even reportedly instructed by the government to refrain from contacts with Ukraine. The government in Seoul appears to be maneuvering between public opinion, citizen viewpoints, and the international situation.