Putin struggles to replenish Russian army amid officer shortages

The Russian mechanized infantry tactics manual assumes that junior officers directly lead their subunits in battle. This leads to significant losses under the accepted tactic of wave infantry attacks. The Russians noticed the problem in 2022 and, by the following summer, prepared the first reform to address the gap.

However, the bloody statistics won't change. To date, the death of over 4,300 officers from the Russian army, Rosgwardia, and other security forces has been confirmed. Of these, 467 held the rank of lieutenant colonel or higher, including eight generals. In the last six months alone, 56 senior officers have died, including one general.

Significant losses in the officer corps seem almost inherent in the Russian army's operations - during World War II, a platoon commander in the Red Army typically survived only a week. Over four years, about 600,000 platoon and company commanders died.

Yurii Fedorov, a member of the Czech Association of International Studies and a former research fellow at the Royal Institute of International Affairs in London, estimates that Russia currently needs 15,000-20,000 lower-ranking officers.

This shortage is one reason for the increasing casualties among Russian soldiers on the front line. From the beginning of the war, they were poorly commanded. As experienced commanders dwindled, old reservists with a Soviet mentality or inexperienced officers just out of school started sending soldiers into battle. There were even instances where students in their final years of officer studies were sent to the front to complete a combat internship as platoon deputy commanders before graduation. But young cadets are not only inadequately trained; they lack any experience even at non-commissioned officer positions.

In 2023, the Russian Ministry of Defense decided that civilian college graduates could undertake a year's military service. If one chooses to become a line officer or reserve officer, they must submit a report and, after six months of service, attend special 3-month courses at military schools. In this case, the military service period is shortened by 3 months, and the army receives a new second lieutenant after 9 months of training.

This solution has helped little. The State Duma, in an effort to quickly improve the personnel situation, raised the age limit for reserve soldiers and non-commissioned officers from 35–50 to 40–55 years at the beginning of the year. The bill also provided the possibility of signing a contract for service in the active reserve from ages 50 to up to 70 for senior officers.

In the occupied areas of Donbas, Zaporizhzhia, and Crimea, the Russians have established a military administration to replace the civilian one during wartime. Initially, positions were filled by collaborators and officials sent from other regions of the Russian Federation. Over time, they had to return to their home offices. The Kremlin decided that their places would be taken by veterans of the so-called special military operation.

To accomplish this, the Ministry of Defense created the "Time of Heroes" program, aimed at selecting a sufficient number of veterans who should have at least a high school education and a willingness to work. Putin explained that involving veterans in the administration of occupied territories is only the beginning.

He emphasized that veterans should occupy leading government positions in many areas of the country, calling them the "new elite" of Russia. The program caused controversy because some participants were accused of war crimes by Ukrainians. These individuals were to be portrayed as heroes.

Even the low requirements set for the "new elite" became an obstacle. Mere patriotism and veteran status proved insufficient because most candidates did not possess even the minimal skills needed to begin training.

Most veterans have been mobilized in the past two years and are primarily from the poorest regions of the Federation. Only a small group of senior officers completed training without issues and are now used in propaganda materials. For example, Col. Artem Zhoha became the plenipotentiary of the president in the Ural Federal District. Meanwhile, Lt. Col. Ivan Amirov is interning in the office of the president's plenipotentiary in the Volga Federal District.

They are, however, the exception. As a result, the Russians extended the program until the end of January next year due to the insufficient number of candidates who meet the requirements. Russian media suggests that young, educated officers should be encouraged, although they are still in short supply.

And so, the Russians have found themselves in another vicious circle.