Putin's Syrian setback: A blow to global ambitions

Bashar al-Assad, who survived the Arab Spring and the civil war while devastating his country, suddenly lost power in just twelve days. He was forced to flee Damascus and seek asylum in Moscow, where Putin granted refuge to him and his family.

Al-Assad's downfall represents a significant failure for the Russian president as well. It weakens him, not only in terms of his image, but during a crucial moment when a change in the U.S. administration could offer Russia new opportunities to resolve the conflict with Ukraine. Nonetheless, the failure of Russia's ally in the Middle East does not necessarily ease the situation for Ukraine.

The declaration of global ambitions by Putin’s regime was marked by Russia's involvement in the Syrian conflict in 2015. A year after the annexation of Crimea and support for "separatists" in Donbas, Russia raised the stakes by intervening militarily beyond the borders of the former Soviet empire for the first time since its dissolution.

Two years later, Putin could claim victory in the Syrian mission. Russian aviation, military advisors, and mercenaries played a crucial role in helping al-Assad maintain control over most of the country and prevent his opponents from seizing power.

The Russian regime pointed to Syria as evidence that, contrary to the "Russia-hostile West" propaganda, Moscow was not isolated but was returning to the global stage, not merely a regional player. After 2017, Russia became one of the key actors in Syria and the region, with which other states involved in the Syrian conflict, such as Iran and Turkey, had to engage.

Al-Assad's fall casts doubt on these global ambitions of Putin. As analyst Ruslan Pukhov noted in the Russian daily "Kommersant," the events in Syria demonstrate that Russia "Moscow does not have sufficient military forces, resources, influence and authority to intervene effectively by force outside the former Soviet Union."

Why was Putin able to save al-Assad between 2015 and 2017, but not now? The simplest answer lies in one word: Ukraine.

Seven or eight years ago, when the Kremlin could effectively assist al-Assad in controlling Syria, it was not engaged in a full-scale war against Ukraine. The situation in Syria shows that contrary to Russian propaganda, this war is a severe burden for Russia, consuming resources to the extent that it cannot seriously commit to defending even a close ally like the former Syrian dictator.

Ukrainians not only defended themselves against the dire consequences of being conquered by Russia during the "special operation" of 2022, but by mounting strong resistance to Putin, they also created conditions that led to the ousting of a particularly brutal dictator from Syria.

An important ally of al-Assad was Iran and the powerful non-state actor backed by the Tehran regime, the military-political organization Hezbollah. The latter was significantly weakened by a recent conflict with Israel, shifting the balance in Syria against al-Assad.

Even if the Russians had been willing and able to help al-Assad, it is unclear how successful they would have been.

Al-Assad’s regime, which relied on massive violence and repression in recent years, had exhausted its social base, losing the last remnants of genuine support, partly due to effective economic sanctions suffocating Syrian society.

Ultimately, at the decisive moment, no one was willing to fight for the dictator. The rapid success of the opposition and the lack of significant resistance from government forces surprised all observers, including those in the West.

Putin has always preferred building good relations with authoritarian leaders rather than with the societies of states from which Russia seeks support. The fall of al-Assad shows that this tactic only works as long as a widely unsupported dictatorship can maintain power through violence.

Today, all authoritarian leaders who have aligned with Putin in recent years are keenly observing al-Assad's fall. Watching the Syrian ruler's exile, they wonder whether they backed the right partner and if Putin is a reliable ally who can defend his clients when needed.

The issue for Russia with the power change in Syria is not only about Putin's image among the "international of dictators" or Moscow’s unmet ambitions as a superpower.

The crucial question for the Kremlin is whether the new authorities in Syria will allow Russia to maintain its two military bases: the naval base in Tartus and the air base in Khmeimim. In 2017, al-Assad leased these bases to Russia for 49 years in gratitude for military assistance in retaining power. It remains unclear if the new authorities will honor these agreements. A British Chatham House analyst, Bronwen Maddox, wrote that the bases are likely to stay under Russian control for now, although she noted that Russia can no longer consider these assets fully secure.

Both bases are vital for Russia's influence in the Middle East and Africa. Tartus is Russia’s only naval base outside the former USSR territory, playing a crucial role not only for its naval presence in the Mediterranean but also in the Indo-Pacific.

After Ukraine, Africa was the next focus for Putin's global expansion. Russia began building relationships with dictators in countries like the Central African Republic, sending mercenaries from the Wagner Group, known for their brutality, who gained access to lucrative minerals in return. The Khmeimim air base served as a key logistical hub for these activities. Its closure would complicate the model of Russia’s presence in Africa known in recent years.

At the same time, Putin's failure in Syria is not necessarily good news for Ukraine and the region. Tatiana Stanovaya, an expert at the Carnegie Russia Eurasia Centre, wrote that the events in Syria might even harden Putin’s stance on Ukraine. If Putin feels he lost face in Syria, he may avoid showing any signs of weakness regarding Ukraine.

Analysts focusing on Russia, even before al-Assad’s fall, warned that Putin might reject initial negotiation offers, believing that continuing the war would strengthen his future negotiating position. The question is how the Trump administration will react to Putin's apparent weakness in Syria.

Unfortunately, the change in Syria does not necessarily bring us closer to peace in Eastern Europe. Europe will watch the developments in Syria with concern for another reason. If the new government does not quickly establish stable, peaceful authority that involves Syrian society in co-governing the country, we may face further civil war, greater chaos, new humanitarian tragedies, and possibly another refugee crisis.

Politically unstable systems in European countries might struggle to cope with an explosion of populism, including elements that consciously or inadvertently play into Moscow's hands.