Race for the Arctic: Nations battle for control and resources

The Project 22220 units are the largest icebreakers in the world. Russia has ordered seven such ships, three of which — Arktika, Sibir, and Ural — are already operational. Each of them is 558 feet long and displaces over 36,000 tons, comparable to the British Queen Elizabeth-class battleships from World War I and II.

Power for these large ships is provided by two RITM-200 water-pressurized reactors with a thermal output of 175 MWt — sufficient to heat residential buildings in a city of 55,000 people. Thanks to the powerful engine room and reinforced hull, the icebreaker can sail through ice up to 9 feet thick.

The ship can also adjust its draft. Full displacement is needed to break the ice on the open sea, but when it needs to carve a path through a frozen river mouth, the Project 22220 icebreaker can reduce its draft from 34.4 feet to just under 30 feet.

Russian ambitions don't stop with Project 22220. The only ordered icebreaker of Project 10510, Rossiya, is already halfway complete. It is even larger (70,000 tons displacement), more powerful (two RITM-400 reactors with 315 MWt), and capable of breaking through ice 11.5 feet thick (some sources suggest up to 13 feet).

Why, for so long, has Russia, which already has the largest fleet of icebreakers in the world, been building new, even more powerful ships of this class at great cost — although not without delays?

The answer lies in the quest for control over the Arctic. The climate catastrophe is gradually making the waters around the pole increasingly accessible for navigation, opening the possibility of using the Northern Sea Route and providing easier access to rich deposits of natural resources.

North of the Arctic Circle lies one-third of the world's natural gas reserves and at least a dozen percent of the world's oil reserves. Rare earth metal deposits are also plentiful. Who can take advantage of them? The shores of the Arctic Ocean belong to six countries:

          
• Canada,
• Denmark,
• Iceland,
• Norway,
• Russia,
• United States.

These countries — along with Sweden and Finland, which lack direct access to the Arctic Ocean — form the Arctic Council, to which representatives of the indigenous peoples of the North are also invited. It is an international forum aimed at cooperation and coordination of activities in the Arctic. This is not a simple task because Arctic states have divergent interests and partially overlapping territorial claims.

Besides claims based on extending economic zones based on continental shelf reach, the United States disputes with Canada over control of one of the sea routes (the Northwest Passage), and three countries — Denmark, Canada, and Russia — have already made claims to the North Pole. These states argue that the Lomonosov Ridge passing through the pole is an extension of their continental shelf.

Not waiting for legal resolutions, in 2007 Russia sent an expedition to the pole that placed two submersibles on the Arctic Ocean floor. One of them planted a capsule with the Russian flag on the seabed with a robotic arm.

“The aim of the expedition is not to showcase Russian claims but to demonstrate that our shelf reaches the North Pole," said Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov at the time. In political parlance, his statement can be interpreted as: "Disputes make no sense because the pole belongs to Russia."

Claims to Arctic areas are not only about exploiting vast deposits of natural resources. They also mean control over the trade route using the Northern Sea Route.

The route itself — and its currently used offshoots, known as the Northwest Passage (along the Canadian coast) and the Northeast Passage (along the Russian coast) — is not new. However, the opportunities associated with the climate catastrophe are new. Climate change in the Arctic is particularly dynamic, and according to current estimates, by around 2050, the Arctic Ocean will be completely ice-free during the summer.

From a maritime transport perspective, this opens a very promising — about 30% shorter — route from Asia to Europe and North America. Its importance could be comparable to the routes through the Suez Canal or the Strait of Malacca in the future. It was precisely to monitor the Northern Sea Route that the Polish-Finnish company ICEYE, with its constellation of SAR satellites, was established.

It's also worth noting that despite the clear benefits of shortening the sea route from Asia to Western Europe or America, the Northeast Passage is currently used almost exclusively by Russia.

Large international trade still, and contrary to not-so-distant forecasts, prefers southern routes. Significant threats to navigation from floating ice, political issues, and logistical and safety issues (and thus insurance costs) influence this.

Providing effective assistance to a sinking vessel or a ship in trouble is extremely difficult in the far north, and the only large ports — Murmansk and Arkhangelsk — are located in the European part of Russia.

The Arctic also has significant strategic importance: it is the shortest, most direct route between the main centers of the United States and Russia. Therefore, during the Cold War, strategic bombers with nuclear bombs were supposed to fly over the Arctic, and this is the route for intercontinental ballistic missiles aimed at each other by nuclear powers.

For Russia, the Arctic has particular importance because, until recently, it was a safe haven for its strategic nuclear-powered submarines with intercontinental ballistic missiles.

Due to the range of this weapon, the submarines do not have to venture into dangerous, hostile waters but have become a kind of mobile, submersible missile launchers. Operating close to their coasts, in areas such as the White Sea or the Kara Sea, they were under the protection of their own air force, navy, and anti-ship systems such as Bastion.

For this reason, they were difficult for an adversary to detect and protected against unexpected threats from NATO's anti-submarine forces.

However, climate changes are causing the Russian security system based on Arctic inaccessibility to collapse like a house of cards. Moscow, instead of guarding a few narrow straits, faces the need to control thousands of miles of open ocean accessible for an increasing part of the year.

For Russia, which accounts for about 40% of the Arctic Ocean's coastline, this issue is compounded by the fact that, apart from it, all Arctic countries are currently NATO members. Hence, the construction, along with large icebreakers, of smaller "patrol vessels" that are, in practice — like the Project 23550 units — armed icebreakers, too.

Although Russia currently appears best prepared for the Arctic rivalry, the West is not sitting on its laurels.

After decades of neglect, the American Polar Security Cutter program, which involves building at least three (optionally up to nine) new large icebreakers capable of breaking ice up to 8 feet thick, has changed the situation.

Although these units will be smaller than the Russian ones, they will significantly boost American potential — currently, the US has only two larger icebreakers, one of which is a 50-year-old unit.

Regardless of the PSC program (which is experiencing significant delays and cost increases), the United States, Canada, and Finland initiated in 2024 a tripartite collaboration under the ICE Pact (Icebreaker Collaboration Effort). The ambitious agreement aims to build 70-90 ships capable of operating in the Arctic over the next decade.

Finland's inclusion in this group is not without reason. It is currently a global leader in icebreaker construction, with, alongside Russia, the most experience in their construction.

Simultaneously, the United States is expanding its Arctic military potential. After revealing the fiction of "Arctic" US Army units that lacked equipment capable of operating in low temperatures and deep snow, the 11th Airborne Division "Arctic Angels" was established (or rather reestablished) in Alaska.

Its 1st and 4th BCT (Brigade Combat Teams) were equipped with gear suited for operations in the far north. The units saw the withdrawal of wheeled Stryker vehicles, replaced by tracked, articulated Beowulf all-terrain vehicles, selected under the Cold Weather All-Terrain Vehicle (CATV) program.

This is not the end of potential rivals in the struggle for this region. A few years ago, China declared itself a "near-Arctic state." Geography does not deter Beijing — it claims that since the northernmost part of the country lies at the 53rd parallel, China is close to the Arctic and can push for a "Polar Silk Road" vision.

Declarations are followed by actions. After a period where China bought icebreakers (like the Ukrainian-built Xue Long), it began building its own. Chinese shipyards are now producing not only medium-sized units like the Ji Di (6,000 tons displacement) but also larger ones, such as the 46,000-ton Xue Long 2, capable of breaking 5 feet of ice.

However, Chinese ambitions are much greater. Alongside conventionally powered units, Beijing is currently building its first large nuclear-powered icebreaker, with a displacement of about 33,000 tons and a length exceeding 492 feet. According to unofficial data, the unit will be capable of breaking through ice up to 6.5 feet thick.

The battle for influence in the Arctic is focused on diplomatic actions and demonstrations of presence, such as China's Arctic circumnavigation or Russian and NATO military maneuvers.

The expansion of forces capable of operating in the north, orders for more icebreakers, and plans to build dozens of vessels capable of sailing beyond the polar circle clearly show that the powers intend to support their claims with actual presence and the ability to control Arctic waters.

In such a confrontation, icebreakers may prove to be no less important than aircraft carriers or other warships. The winner of this confrontation will gain not only access to invaluable resources in the future but also control over a trade route that will be fully available — a matter of time — and will be a breakthrough in the global economy and supply chain, comparable to the opening of the Suez or Panama Canal.