Rising Baltic tensions: NATO's naval challenges intensify
"We want to strengthen our military presence in the Baltic," stated Donald Tusk, summarizing his conversation with NATO Secretary General Mark Rutte. Despite Finland and Sweden joining NATO, the Russian threat has not been neutralized, and the naval forces of NATO fleets remain insufficient. What capabilities does NATO have in the Baltic?
The Baltic Sea is a theater of hybrid activities—hostile actions carried out by China and Russia against NATO countries in ways that make identifying the perpetrators difficult, with harm occurring below the threshold of open, "kinetic" war.
Examples of such activities include GPS signal disruptions and repeated attacks on underwater infrastructure using civilian ships. Dropping anchors in strategic locations and dragging them across the seabed damages gas pipelines and underwater cables.
Although on December 26, 2024, Finland was able to quickly respond to the damage to telecommunications cables and stop the perpetrator—the ship Eagle S flying the Cook Islands flag—it is worth remembering that this was a reaction to already inflicted damage. Eagle S managed to damage telecommunications cables and the EstLink 2 power connection between Finland and Estonia.
NATO naval forces in the Baltic
NATO's naval forces in the Baltic are limited, and NATO fleets are still waiting for real reinforcement.
Germany's navy, theoretically the strongest, has six Type 212A submarines, five corvettes, and as many as 11 frigates. However, it is important to note that Germany's largest and most modern ships—four Baden-Württemberg-class frigates—are designed for asymmetric conflicts and expeditionary operations. Moreover, Germany must divide its fleet between two bodies of water—the Baltic and North Seas.
The Polish Navy currently consists of two aging Oliver Hazard Perry-class frigates, one submarine ORP "Orzeł," and the "patrol corvette" ORP "Ślązak," a ship that, after 18 years of construction, turned out to be under-armed and practically incapable of combat (which, according to the Ministry of National Defense, is to change).
The capability to combat enemy surface ships is currently provided by three Project 660M missile ships (Orkan-class) armed with Swedish RBS15 anti-ship missiles. These small vessels, with a displacement of about 385 tons, lack anti-aircraft or anti-submarine capabilities, and their ability to operate in challenging conditions is very limited.
The Swedish Navy has only seven small corvettes, of which the five largest and most modern—Visby-class vessels—have a displacement of just 660 tons. Sweden's submarine fleet includes one older type and three A19 types. Efforts to replace them with modern A26 Blekinge-class units are delayed by many years.
The Finnish Navy also has limited capabilities. It consists of only eight small missile boats, each with a displacement of 275 tons.
In practice, this means that NATO countries on the Baltic—aside from Germany and, to a very limited extent, Poland—do not, for example, have the capability for consistent, weather-independent control of the Baltic. They also lack the ability to effectively detect and potentially combat Russian submarines, as land-based aircraft or helicopters cannot fully replace a large ship capable of operating in all weather conditions.
Meanwhile, Russia can freely reinforce its Baltic Fleet during peacetime and deploy it from ports before commencing military actions. Furthermore, in the event of blocked access to the Baltic through the Danish straits, it can reinforce it by moving smaller ships through inland waters.
However, experts point to submarines, including those capable of launching cruise missiles from underwater like some Project 636.3 submarines, as its most dangerous component.
The Baltic is not NATO's "lake"
This is especially important in the context of the belief expressed by politicians, among others, that after Finland and Sweden joined NATO, the Baltic became an internal NATO "lake" to which the Russian Baltic Fleet would not have access.
Nothing could be further from the truth, as explained in detail by Commander Tomasz Witkiewicz in response to similar statements.
New large ships needed in the Baltic
These weaknesses have been identified, and Poland, Sweden, and Finland are working to expand their fleets with large ships possessing significant anti-aircraft capabilities and capable of conducting or supporting ASW (anti-submarine warfare) operations.
The entry of these units into service—along with Poland's Orka program—will positively impact the balance of forces in the Baltic, but in the best-case scenario, the situation will not begin to change until the end of the decade.
