Russia unleashes experimental Grom-E1 missile in Kharkiv attack
The Russians launched an attack in Kharkiv using an experimental weapon that left a significant crater and widespread destruction. Here's what is known about the mysterious hybrid of the Grom-E1 bomb and missile.
According to Ukrainian reports, at exactly 8:51 PM Eastern Time, on the night between October 28 and 29, 2024, a mysterious hybrid of a missile and bomb, the Grom-E1, struck a house in the Osnovianskyi district. This resulted in the complete destruction of four houses and damage to 19 others.
Grom-E1: The mysterious Russian missile bomb
The Russians are believed to have used a special rocket bomb developed for the Su-57 aircraft in the attack. Little is known about this weapon, but initial mentions date back to 2015, with more details emerging from photos of wreckage in Ukraine.
Conceptually, it is an evolution of the FAB-500 bomb outfitted with a UMPK module, to which the propulsion section of the Ch-38 missile has been added. The entire assembly reportedly weighs about 1,323 pounds, with the explosive material accounting for 694 pounds.
This concept is similar to the French guided bombs AASM Hammer, which is also equipped with a rocket booster. Consequently, the Russian glide bomb, when released from a high altitude, has a range of up to 75 miles, allowing it to hit targets beyond the reach of most anti-aircraft systems.
Only systems like the Patriot, SAMP/T, or the S-300 (if Ukraine can obtain the missiles for them) can intercept aircraft flying at high altitudes over distances of more than 62 miles.
The Grom-E1 bomb's guidance system is the same as that used in other guided FAB UMPK bombs, relying on a combination of inertial and satellite navigation. This allows for accuracy within a range of a few to several meters, even in the presence of electronic warfare systems. However, the large explosive payload mitigates any significant issues with targeting precision.
A notable advantage for the Ukrainians is that Grom-E1 bombs are not manufactured by converting old equipment but require new construction. Consequently, their supply is limited, resulting in infrequent Russian attacks using them.
