Russian Orthodox Church: Faith in service of Kremlin's war agenda

During Vladimir Putin's first presidential term, I lived in Petersburg. I was surprised to see that during most of his appearances, he was accompanied by the then Patriarch of Moscow and All Russia, Alexy II. Russians explained that it was Putin who stood by Alexy, not the other way around, because presidential power, like the Tsar's, is believed to come from God, and the Patriarch's presence legitimizes the president's words.

Today, the same professor from Petersburg University of Education, when asked about the relationship between the Danilov Monastery and the Kremlin, just waves his hand. It's not only because he fears talking to a journalist from the West but because now it's the Patriarch standing beside the president.

After the fall of communism, the Church hoped its position would be restored, regaining influence over spiritual matters. However, the alliance with politics did not go as planned. While Alexy II enjoyed a degree of freedom, Kirill has consistently aligned with the Kremlin, especially regarding Ukraine. As early as 2009, he criticized the independence of the Orthodox Church of the Kyiv Patriarchate, which Moscow did not recognize, similarly to the Orthodox Church of Ukraine, established in 2018.

Kirill claimed that Kyiv betrayed the "true faith" and sought to reclaim it. Just before the full-scale war broke out, he stated, "We call Kyiv the 'mother of Russian cities.' (...) Here, Russian Orthodoxy began, and it cannot be abandoned due to circumstances beyond the control of this historical and spiritual connection."

Kirill views Ukrainians and Russians as one nation that "foreign forces want to divide." Therefore, from the start, he supported the "special military operation" and called for prayers for Russian soldiers fighting against "the most powerful forces ruling the world today."

"Every parish should help those on the front line. We must mobilize our parishioners to collect items and food," Kirill urged a year ago at the Alexander Nevsky Lavra in Petersburg. The Church quickly responded, launching fundraisers for soldiers and their families and actively participating in related activities.

By fall 2023, the Russian Orthodox Church was integrated into the conscription process. Initially, this involvement was somewhat hesitant. Today, as volunteer resources and "residents" of penal colonies dwindle, priests are conducting agitation campaigns in churches, calling for defense against the "forces of evil."

The Church has long engaged in propaganda, labeling the war in Ukraine as "holy." According to the synod, it's a war against the satanic, corrupt West, which deviated from true Christian beliefs centuries ago. Soldiers on the front line fulfill a divine mission, fighting for the unification of Russian peoples under one scepter.

Russia, and thus the Church, has reverted to the "trinity doctrine" formulated during imperial times, which posits that the Russian nation includes Great Russians, Little Russians, and Belarusians as one great Russian nation. Kremlin propaganda has become the official line of the Church, as detailed in the document "The Present and Future of the Russian World."

Patriarch Kirill does not act purely out of love for Mother Russia. The Church gains financially from its cooperation with the Russian Ministry of Defense and strives for control over souls. The Kremlin promised Kirill that after victory, his influence would extend to Ukraine as well.

Already, the Ministry of Defense is expanding the Church's role in the military. As part of an ongoing propaganda campaign, the deputy head of the Main Political Directorate of the Russian Ministry of Defense, Oleg Veselkov, announced in early December that the Russian army created the role of a religious assistant.

Veselkov described this role as "a confessor for the commander, always with him — on the front line, at the command post, among the troops." He noted that priests in the Russian army will now work with soldiers individually, directly on the front lines.

The first 30 young priests completed their training at the end of November and have been sent to the front. One lecturer, Roman Silantyev, a well-known Russian ideologist of Pan-Slavism, discussed "neo-paganism and the roots of Ukrainian nationalism" in his classes.

Since the war began, at least seven Orthodox priests have been killed on the front line, including two in the last month. This is a sacrifice that bishops appear willing to bear.

In the occupied territories, the Russian Orthodox Church took over temples, church buildings, and lands in the dioceses of Dzhankoi, Berdiansk, Rovenki, and Kherson. In these areas, Patriarch Kirill appointed bishops under Moscow's control.

This happened as the authorities claimed that the Orthodox Church of Ukraine abandoned the properties and the faithful. In what sounds like a Soviet narrative from past invasions, they declared that they took these over to protect them from destruction.

Any grassroots resistance against the hierarchs' actions is suppressed. In early March 2022, over 300 clergy members of the Russian Orthodox Church published an open letter calling for reconciliation and an end to the war, stating that "the Ukrainian people must decide their fate, not under the gun, and without pressure from both the West and the East." Bishops responded by sending them to monasteries and ordered silence.

In the occupied territories, only priests with special ideological training are sent. For this, an "inter-parish training center for specialists of the Luhansk diocese" was established in the Luhansk region, overseen by Metropolitan Panteleimon, appointed by Moscow.

In this manner, the Russian Orthodox Church has become a powerful tool of Kremlin propaganda, spreading messages under the guise of religion, justifying war crimes, and attempting to legitimize authority in occupied territories.