Russian river failures: Repeated setbacks in Ukrainian conflict

For nearly three years, the Russians have struggled to effectively organize crossings over Ukrainian rivers, even during hasty attacks. Each endeavor ended disastrously for them. Recently, the Ukrainians destroyed another pontoon bridge on the Sejm River.

Ukrainian artillerymen have destroyed a Russian pontoon bridge over the Sejm for the third time. This marks the elimination of their third engineering crossing.

One of the PMP-M sets, or modernized pontoon bridge parks, was destroyed before it even reached the riverbank. Currently, the Russian military cannot deliver supplies or equipment in an area of 247 square miles, corresponding to the territory the Russian army occupied in Ukraine last year.

Thus, the myth of Russian prowess has fallen once again, this time regarding overcoming water obstacles. On training grounds, the Russians swiftly and frequently built crossings for tanks, transporters, and even armored trains. However, in real war conditions, when they stormed water obstacles hastily, they encountered enormous difficulties.

Since the beginning of the war, the Russians have often had to stop before water obstacles. An example is the crossing over the Teterev River north of Kyiv, which took them four days to build despite almost no resistance from the Ukrainian side. Initially, they tried to ford the river, not considering the need to cross a wide, muddy valley first, significantly hindering their access to the riverbank.

Nearly three years ago in southern Ukraine, the defense was based on rivers in the Temiriwka, Zieleny Pole, Poltawka, and Hulajpol regions. The Russians didn't even try to cross due to the lack of sufficient ferry equipment in their brigades.

The 4th Guards Kantemirovskaya Tank Division felt the impact of this issue when they got stuck at the bend of the Donets River at the end of April 2022. Their technical columns were not accompanied by pontoon parks that could have facilitated the crossing. Only later did the arrival of the PMP-M set enable the formation of a bridge.

Ukrainian reconnaissance drones continuously monitored the construction of the crossing. Just 20 minutes after its completion, heavy artillery opened fire on it. The Ukrainians specifically waited until the first tanks and armored carriers entered the crossing. Then, they destroyed the bridge and later targeted the vehicles stuck at the bridgehead.

The remains of the Russian units were shattered by air attacks using Su-25 aircraft and combat drones. The Russians lost about 80 vehicles and 485 soldiers, completely decimating the battalion group of the 74th Motorized Rifle Brigade. Only 60-70 soldiers managed to retreat without injury.

To support the retreat and secure the bridgehead, the Russians sent amphibious infantry fighting vehicles, which were also destroyed by artillery fire before they reached the other side. Within a few hours, the Russians lost the equivalent of a battalion, representing one of their biggest defeats, also in terms of image. The Kremlin had boasted of its troops' skills in crossing rivers.

The contemporary doctrine of river crossing was developed by the Russians simultaneously with the development of their armored-mechanized forces. As early as the 1920s, the first modern pontoon bridges were developed and introduced into engineer regiments, similar to other armies, including the Polish.

The currently used pontoon bridge system directly derives from a design developed just before World War II. At that time, the Red Army was one of the best-prepared for operations on inland waters. The modernized PMP is still considered a good set, although its basic version was introduced in 1962.

One pontoon park consists of 32 trucks with pontoons, four with bridgeheads, two with rolled roadways, 16 BMK-150M tugboats, and a repair vehicle. This allows the formation of bridges with load capacities ranging from 20 to 170 tons and lengths from 42 feet to 1,253 feet, depending on hydrological conditions.

Ukrainian rivers usually have wide valleys filled with old riverbeds, swamps, and floodplains, which impede the movement of heavy equipment. Therefore, the Russians must carefully choose construction sites for crossings as they lack many options. Additionally, they have not prepared their units for operations under real combat conditions.

The Russians repeat the same mistakes during every attempt to build river crossings. First, they do not provide adequate air defense protection. Despite the passing years, they still do not possess effective electronic warfare measures that could neutralize Ukrainian drones.

Despite the widespread use of reconnaissance drones, the Russians cannot counteract their operations, allowing Ukrainians to quickly and precisely direct artillery fire on crossings.

The Russians also struggle with counter-battery fire. To effectively neutralize the enemy, one must first determine the position from which shots are fired, which is enabled by artillery radars. Systems such as the 1L219 Zoopark can detect rockets from a distance of 25 miles and artillery shells from 6-7 miles. Despite the introduction of radar into service in 1989, even seven years ago, there were too few to outfit all units. In 2017, modernized versions began to enter service, but intelligence data indicate that one radar is allocated per division.

Additionally, there is a lack of effective communication and an integrated battlefield management system, which prevents the rapid utilization of acquired information. Thus, detecting shells from a distance of 6 miles does not help.

As a result, whether the Russians attempt to cross using pontoon bridges, wading, or using amphibious vehicles, every attempt without properly securing the bridgehead ends in defeat—just like over the Donets or Sejm.