ConflictsRussia's costly grip on Ukraine's resource-rich ruins

Russia's costly grip on Ukraine's resource-rich ruins

The Russians have seized over 80 percent of Ukraine's coal resources and 25 percent of its oil deposits, although they are unable to utilize most of these. If mining and production occur, it is only in territories occupied since 2014. Their scorched earth tactic has backfired.

Vladimir Putin
Vladimir Putin
Images source: © kremlin.ru

The military actions ongoing since 2014 have devastated the Donbas region, one of the richest in natural resources in Europe. Only three residential buildings were left standing. The region is now a sea of ruins.

The same situation applies to industrial plants, with around 60 percent destroyed to various degrees.

The Russians have taken almost all of Ukraine's dolomite reserves for metallurgy and carbonate raw materials for soda ash production. They have seized over 80 percent of resources like bismuth, cadmium, and tin.

Most significantly, they have taken control of coal resources, which has greatly affected Ukraine. It's no wonder that by September 2022, the government in Kyiv had completely banned coal export. By mid-last year, Energy Minister Herman Halushchenko announced that the Russians had seized 80 percent of deposits since the onset of the war, leading to a coal production drop of about 45 percent.

Profitable unprofitability

Due to the scale of destruction, the Russians are unable to benefit from these assets. They mainly "nourish" themselves with propaganda, portraying Ukraine as a failed state from which they have taken industry.

After 2017, industrial plants were handed over to Russian oligarchs. However, they did not plan to invest in reconstructing these facilities. Thus, in many cases, they transported most of the usable machinery to Russia. At the beginning of this year, the Russian State Duma approved a development strategy, but contrary to its name, it envisages the closure of unprofitable mines in the occupied Luhansk region.

Representatives of the occupational administration stated that "inefficient and unsafe enterprises with difficult mining-geological conditions and a high risk of accidents" are due to be shut down.

Investors who received Ukrainian mines at a reduced price now have to inform the authorities of the enterprises' unprofitability. They are to receive compensation for the dismantled plants. The regulations also cover companies acquired after 2022. In this case, none of the factories or mines are usable.

Ruins for sale or as a gift

At the beginning of 2023, the Russians captured the salt-rich Soledar deposits, leaving Ukraine with only one of the fifteen deposits. However, over the past decade, nearly 90 percent of Ukraine’s needs were met by the Artemivske deposit in Soledar. Today, none of the six salt mines there are operational, with buildings 30 to 60 percent destroyed.

The next city on the Russian path was Bakhmut, where all industrial buildings and about 90 percent of residential buildings were destroyed. Three large mechanical industry plants and two mines were annihilated.

In Soviet tradition, adopted by the Russian Federation, it is commonplace for field commanders to give "birthday presents" to their leaders. For example, in November 1942, the Soviet counteroffensive at Rzhev was intended as a birthday gift for Stalin but turned into Zhukov's greatest defeat.

Eighty years later, capturing Bakhmut was meant as a gift for Putin. Since the city wasn’t captured by the targeted deadline through maneuver, artillery, including the heaviest 8-inch caliber, was brought in, reducing Bakhmut to rubble. The "gift," although several months late, turned out to be ruins.

The same happened in Pokrovsk, Avdiivka, and Toretsk. The situation is worst in Vuhledar, which was almost entirely destroyed. All three mines in the vicinity also lie in complete ruin.

The plants in Soledar and Bakhmut—along with mines in Sudan and Syria—were intended as the spoils of war for Yevgeny Prigozhin for his part in their capture.

Today, there's no trace left of Prigozhin or the facilities.

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