Russia's military evolution: From Ukraine to a potential NATO threat

When will Russia be ready for another attack? Publicized analyses from Danish intelligence have made a significant impact, suggesting that Russia will regain the capability to attack NATO about five years after the end of the war in Ukraine.

Similar timelines are suggested by Polish experts, such as Reserve Colonel Maciej Korowaj, who estimates five years, German intelligence projecting readiness by the end of the current decade, and the Bundeswehr's Inspector General, General Carsten Breuer, pointing to 2029. U.S. intelligence and Reserve Major Michał Fiszer offer slightly shorter timelines, indicating Russia's potential readiness for attack as soon as 2028.

These assessments are usually accompanied by a caveat: readiness to attack does not automatically mean a war will start.

Moscow's expansionist ambitions may be curtailed by the rebuilding of Western military potential—the same potential that effectively deterred the USSR and the entire Eastern Bloc for half a century during the Cold War from implementing scenarios like "Seven days to the River Rhine," or other attack variants on the West.

Despite sustaining enormous losses over the past three years, Russia is nonetheless capable of rapidly rebuilding its potential. This capability is clearly demonstrated by the current situation in Ukraine: the waves of poorly trained and poorly equipped Russian soldiers, derogatorily referred to as "mobiks," belong to the distant past.

Although the media reports on the largest spring conscription for the Russian army in years, the current initiative at the front has been gained by the Russians without the involvement of conscripts: professional soldiers and volunteers who decided to sign a contract are fighting in Russian units in Ukraine. Conscripts are fighting only in Russia, particularly in the Kursk and Belgorod regions, where, according to Russian nomenclature, an anti-terrorist operation is being conducted.

The reestablished training system, after decades of decline, means that Russian soldiers currently deployed to the front are, statistically, better trained than their Ukrainian counterparts, according to assessments by experts like Reserve Colonel Piotr Lewandowski.

The reactivation of the training system is complemented by the surprisingly high resilience of the Russian industry compared to forecasts from two years ago. While mobilization warehouses are already emptying, and at the current rate of losses, Russia will soon lose the ability to replenish some equipment categories, strategic aviation, the navy, and certain types of anti-aircraft systems are in an increasingly poor state, and their condition may deteriorate further over time.

Nevertheless, Russia has managed, according to civilian analyst Jarosław Wolski among others, to preserve about 600 modern tanks, albeit at the cost of weakening units fighting in Ukraine.

Considerable forces are being trained deep within the country and are not currently engaged in the fight. These forces may be deployed to the front at a decisive moment, or they may already be preparing for use elsewhere after the end of the war in Ukraine.

This situation is highlighted by the RAND think tank, which outlines four scenarios for the rebuilding of Russian armed forces. The first scenario, called the "Shoigu plan" (named after Sergey Shoigu, Secretary of the Russian Federation Security Council), envisions building a larger army than in 2022 but modernizing it "in limited areas" due to the long-term problems faced by the Russian defense sector.

The second scenario involves building a large army equipped with not very modern but mass-produced equipment, which is within the reach of Russian industry. The third scenario foresees a numerical reduction of the army, accompanied by a technological leap resulting from the application of new, though less numerous, weapon systems.

The fourth variant is the restructuring of the army on a Western model, using patterns drawn from, among others, the organization of the U.S. Army and supported by external knowledge acquired through cooperation with foreign partners.

The assessment of these scenarios was undertaken in an interview with PAP by Dr. Jakub Olchowski from the Institute of Central Europe. In his opinion, predicting the development direction of the Russian army, due to the large number of variables, resembles reading tea leaves. He considered the third and fourth scenarios to be the least likely.

In the expert's estimation, the primary focus should be on the plan to numerically expand Russian armed forces and the limited attempt at army modernization, constrained by industrial capabilities, or the "Shoigu plan."

As noted on platform X by Konrad Muzyka from the analytical firm Rochan Consulting, "the [Russian] industry will not fill the gaps formed as a result of the war in the next 10 years. This thesis must be continuously verified based on production data of tanks, infantry fighting vehicles, or Sino-Russian economic cooperation."

Foreign support could significantly alter the future of the Russian armed forces. There are emerging opinions in Russia about the necessity of modernizing artillery and abandoning the post-Soviet 152 mm caliber in favor of the "Western" 155 mm caliber, currently being implemented by China.

Regardless of the direction of the changes that the Russian armed forces will undergo in the coming years, by the beginning of the next decade, Moscow will likely have a rebuilt army. This army may significantly differ from the one that, over three years ago, initiated a "three-day special operation" and, instead of achieving a quick victory, became bogged down in Ukraine, suffering its greatest losses since World War II.