Russia's population crisis worsens amid Ukraine conflict

The issue of Russia's shrinking population has been recognized at the Kremlin for years. Even in the early 1990s, experts warned that the transition to a market economy would result in a temporary decline in births. They also assumed that prosperity would increase, healthcare would improve, and life expectancy would rise.

Indeed, after years of decline, the number of births in Russia began to systematically increase from 2006. The peak occurred in 2014, when 1.943 million children were born. Since then, however, there has been a year-on-year decrease, which Russian demographers attribute to the crisis that began in the Federation at that time. By the end of 2022, the birth rate had decreased by 6.7% to 1.304 million. It is estimated that this year only 1.2 million children will be born, and next year, 100,000 fewer.

Worse yet, from the Kremlin's perspective, in the years 2014–2015, not only did the number of births begin to fall, but the number of deaths also increased. Previously, over the last 12 years, Russian mortality had steadily declined. The Ministry of Labor and Social Protection attributes this reversal to serious problems in the healthcare system, worsening accessibility, and deepening socio-economic difficulties.

Alcoholism and, in general, the unhealthy lifestyle of Russians are frequently cited issues. Tobacco ranks second to alcohol as a leading cause of death.

Experts from the Center for Scientific, Political, and Ideological Thought have concluded that the main cause of the Russian demographic crisis is flawed economic policy and the shift to a supposedly free market while ignoring demographic aspects of reforms. Moreover, they suggest that there has been an ideological shift toward consumerism, resulting in a decline in religiosity among the "Russian person."

The harsh reality remains that, according to state statistical agency data, the country's population decreased by a total of 1.3 million between 2020 and 2021, with deaths exceeding births by 1.7 million. This decline was greatest among ethnic Russians, whose numbers, according to the 2021 census, decreased by 5.4 million compared to the years 2010-2021. These problems began even before the attack on Ukraine. Currently, Russia's population is about 143.5 million, while at the beginning of the century, it was 146.3 million.

Falling birth rates are leading to fewer conscripts available for military service, which is already causing issues for the Russian Ministry of Defense. This concern was anticipated at the beginning of the century when it was estimated that between 2010 and 2025, the number of potential conscripts aged 20 to 29 would decrease by 44%.

In March 2020, then-Defense Minister Sergey Shoigu reported that the number of conscripts had dropped to 225,000, almost 100,000 fewer than five years earlier. The solution was supposed to be contracted service, which would partially offset losses caused by the reduced scale of conscription.

As the military gradually approached the desired size, Putin initiated a war that disrupted the entire reform process and necessitated changes to expand conscription. The first reform, resulting from wartime experiences, began in the fall of 2022. For the first time, it was decided to increase the army's personnel and initiate regular reserve training, which includes over 25 million men. At least in theory, since, for the vast majority, the health condition of the reservists is so poor that active service is impossible.

At that time, the authorities decided to mobilize an additional 500,000 conscripts and raise the upper age limit for enlistment by 3 years, from 27 to 30. The lower age limit remained at 18.

However, it turned out that increasing losses meant the army's size was still inadequate. Consequently, the Russians prepared another reform. Once again, it was decided to expand the personnel. The army is ultimately expected to have 1.5 million soldiers. Nevertheless, the minimum conscription age was raised to 21 years old.

The Russians concluded that eighteen-year-olds are still children whose bodies have not fully matured physically, making it difficult for them to endure the rigors of warfare. Another reason, openly discussed by the Ministry of Labor and Social Protection, was the desire to safeguard the young male population, which was already unimpressive before, and the war has deepened the crisis even further.

Although politicians have been aware of demographic problems, they did not respond systematically for a long time. Only in the government's Unified Plan for Achieving National Development Goals, adopted in the fall of 2021, did initial proposals appear to help improve birth rates. The aim was to achieve stabilization by 2030.

However, they overlooked the need to increase life expectancy and improve healthcare quality. The government's focus was primarily on incentives for women to give birth. They were offered a monthly allowance for childbirth and child-rearing, the provision of so-called maternity capital, which translates into a future pension, and preferential conditions for applying for a mortgage.

The direct effect of these payments was similar to Poland's 500+ program—birth rates did not increase; in fact, they began to fall more rapidly. The reasons for failure were akin to those of PiS's flagship program. Surveyed women cited inadequate healthcare during pregnancy and infancy, the lack of nurseries and kindergartens, and political instability in the country. Now, another issue has been added—the "special military operation."

According to experts, the Russian invasion of Ukraine and the announcement of partial mobilization acted as a demographic test for the country. According to the Gaidar Institute, the negative factors mentioned included the worsening economic situation, the conscription of some men into the army, and increased levels of anxiety.

To alleviate this final factor, Sardana Avksentieva, a State Duma deputy and vice-chief of the New Nation faction, proposed introducing a four-day working week for parents in Russia. Avksentieva noted that for many working mothers, a four-day workweek would provide much-needed relief. The deputy hopes to restore the balance between work and personal life for employees and believes that women might consider having children if they have more family time.

However, this proposal may prove challenging, as Russian industry, now operating on a wartime economy, is already suffering from a chronic labor shortage. For now, the Duma has supported a four-day workweek for large families and single-parent families.

Experts also point out that the authorities overlook another aspect. During military operations, more than 300,000 men have died. As noted by demographer Igor Yefremov in a report by banki.ru, the number of births has noticeably declined in regions with a higher participation of men in the operation.

In the Krasnoyarsk Territory, the birth rate fell from 1.5 children per woman in 2021 to 1.22 in 2023; in Buryatia, it dropped from 1.87 to 1.59; in the Kaliningrad region, it decreased from 1.38 to 1.17; and in the Pskov region, it fell from 1.49 to 1.29. At the same time, the number of deaths exceeded births by 495,000. Last year, in the first nine months alone, the number of deaths exceeded births by nearly 676,000.

In comments below articles, Russians joke that soon the State Duma will consider allowing polygamy just to save demographics and prevent refugees from entering the country. Already, industry is looking more favorably on people from former Soviet republics and South Asia. With increasing mortality among Russian men, the Kremlin may have no choice but to open its borders more widely.

Slawek Zagórski