Ukraine braces for critical year amid mounting challenges

The year 2024 ends for Ukraine with significant territorial losses, logistical problems, and ongoing personnel shortages in front-line units. The last three months have been the worst for the Ukrainian army since the spring of 2022. Quick remedial actions have done little to help: in November, Major General Mykhailo Drapaty was appointed as the new Commander of the Land Forces, and a month earlier, a plan was announced to mobilize another 160,000 soldiers to meet urgent needs.

Without further radical actions, the situation could worsen. The question is whether the government and citizens are ready for further sacrifices. As the war continues with increasing losses and further failures, support for the fight declines. The year 2025 could be crucial for the conflict's future in the country's southeastern part. It may end with the Russians taking over the entire Donbas.

Ukrainians have faced a chronic shortage of human resources since the end of the first year of the war. Kyiv has mobilized 4.5% of its citizens and can no longer significantly increase that percentage. There are several reasons for this situation.

The most important is a demographic crisis that has been deepening for years, further exacerbated by the outbreak of war. The population in areas controlled by Kyiv has dropped from 38 million to 25-27 million. Formally, Ukraine can mobilize approximately 5 million people. However, men aged 25 are being mobilized to secure the country's future, with numerous exclusions further reducing the pool. Therefore, realistically, Kyiv can count on a maximum of 2-2.5 million people, of which 1,050,000 have already been called up.

Improving the situation could involve increasing the draft within Ukraine and bringing back conscription-age men who left the country after the war broke out. Of the nearly 700,000 men who went to Western Europe, about 200,000 met the requirements of the new mobilization law. But here, too, there is a problem with politicians unwilling to make further calls and citizens who believe the army is wasting soldiers' lives.

After a mobilization delayed by a year, Ukrainians have formed at least ten new brigades. There is talk of six mechanized brigades, three infantry brigades within the Territorial Defense, and one Jaeger unit. President Volodymyr Zelensky mentioned 14 brigades in August. Hence, in October, the decision was made to call up 160,000 people. This would allow staffing up to 85% of the units' personnel.

This is a necessary condition if Kyiv wants to stop Russian aggression. However, even if it were possible to mobilize people, another problem arises: all brigades lack equipment.

Deciding to mobilize is one thing, but carrying it out is another. Ukrainians are holding off on execution because they have nothing to equip the new units. Only four newly formed brigades have dedicated equipment, including armored vehicles, engineering equipment, and artillery. The rest received only trucks, off-road vehicles, and infantry weapons and equipment.

Ukrainians cannot afford to send inadequately equipped and trained soldiers. Personnel losses hurt them significantly more than the Russians, and these continue to rise due to exhaustion and lack of rotation, causing a massive wave of desertions. The newspaper "Financial Times" reported that in just the first ten weeks of this year, more Ukrainian soldiers deserted than in the first two years of the war. The Ukrainian prosecutor's office has launched 60,000 cases against soldiers suspected of desertion. Since these data were published, the situation has certainly not improved.

The Ukrainian army has fallen into a vicious circle from which it can only escape with the help of Western allies. President Zelensky plays a major role in this. However, he has lost much of his charisma, which once allowed him to cover up political mistakes. When the government in Kyiv engaged in PR activities rather than pure propaganda, it was easier for citizens to accept unpopular decisions, especially those regarding movement restrictions and the shift to wartime modes. Currently, this is no longer accepted with resignation but with protests.

Zelensky has alienated many with his lack of military understanding, dismissals of line and staff officers, and by surrounding himself with people who do not strongly challenge the mistakes being made. In Kyiv, it is said that around the Mariinsky Palace, the president's residence, there is not only a brick wall but a political one that prevents bad information from getting through. The president also does not see mistakes in his own actions, which have not gone unnoticed by allies.

For some time now, Zelensky has been perceived as a supplicant, not a partner for discussion. Without changing how negotiations are conducted and policies on the image, support for helping Ukraine will decrease. Without adequate support from politicians and the public, more tanks, armored vehicles, and ammunition will not reach the east.

This is especially true for the new administration that will take office in the White House in January, which does not understand the nuances of international politics well and will be guided primarily by the language of business. This is evident from recent announcements by Donald Trump, who has made further assistance contingent on financial and economic matters.

None of the command position changes made by Zelensky have brought the expected results on the front lines. The only visible change was the abandonment of stubborn city defenses, with Ukrainians preferring to withdraw rather than suffer massive losses. The situation is complicated because, in selected front sections where Russians operate, Ukrainians cannot conduct a stable defense based on strong field fortifications. This results from a lack of personnel stretched lines, and earlier neglect in preparing a deep defense: in many places, sections that battalions should occupy are held by companies.

This also complicates the command process. Units or even subunits are often detached from brigades and moved to threatened sections of the front, complicating the command process and logistical issues. This is most evident on the Operational Command-Brigade command line.

The abandonment of an intermediate command level, the division, causes problems during rapidly changing front-line situations and limits combat capabilities. Independent brigades commanded directly by Operational Commands proved effective during the first 18 months of the war when Ukrainians employed maneuver defense.

Ukrainian brigades are larger than those in other armies. Each is an independent brigade combat team with logistical, technical, and medical support. This extensive support allows for operations based on their resources, at least for several days after deployment to the operating area. This facilitates great flexibility in action.

However, in static defense, with growing shortages of resources and personnel, coordinating the actions of many units and tactical connections is a frequent challenge, translating into overloading the Operational Commands' work. The creation of battle groups was supposed to be a solution that would provide an intermediate command level. However, without expanded staff, they remain inefficient. Improving the command process will be one of the most important tasks facing General Drapaty, and Ukraine should implement reforms as soon as possible.

Without radical changes, the pace of Russian advancement will increase, which is already substantial. The average daily advance has not fallen below 10 square miles for the past three months. Since 2014, the Russians have managed to occupy about 99% of the Luhansk region, 66% of the Donetsk region, and 73% each of the Zaporizhzhia and Kherson regions. Although the situation for the Ukrainians grows more difficult daily, the Kremlin is still far from achieving its strategic plans.

Currently, capturing the Donetsk region will take approximately two more years. However, it's not just about slowing the Russian advance and depleting the Russians but stopping their progress. If this were a democratic country, the current actions might be visible. Still, in an authoritarian country like Russia, the deaths of thousands of soldiers will not affect the situation at the Kremlin. Ukrainians must physically stop the Russians and start pushing them back. At the current stage and with existing problems, this seems wishful thinking.