Ukraine's covert strikes stir global debate on tactics

Eliminating enemy commanders is a practice with a long history. During World War II, the Home Army carried out an assassination attempt on Franz Kutschera, the SS and police commander for the Warsaw district of the General Government. Similarly, Czechoslovak commandos killed Reinhard Heydrich, the protector of Bohemia and Moravia.

Although such operations have raised moral questions—for example, Prime Minister Winston Churchill deemed assassinations of military and political leaders unethical—they have become an important tool of warfare. This is true even when considering the balance of gains and losses, including German retaliatory actions against civilians.

In the case of Ukrainian actions, the assassinations of senior Russian officers serve as retaliatory measures against individuals suspected of orchestrating or directing attacks on civilians. Some assassinations, such as the one involving Col. Pilot Dmitriy Golenko, chief of staff of the 52nd heavy bomber regiment responsible for planning raids on Ukrainian cities, have sparked significant controversy.

These controversies arise not only from the manner in which some assassinations have been carried out but also due to possible legal violations. International experts have pointed out that if the assassins managed to get so close, they could have kidnapped him, "taken him to Kyiv, and put him on trial instead of committing murder."

Similar operations have been recently conducted by Israel's Mossad, which has eliminated Hezbollah members using explosive devices hidden in pagers. While these actions have resulted in a significant—though not primarily intended—propaganda effect, the image impact of Ukrainian actions seems to have been the opposite in the West. However, image issues are not the most crucial consideration here.

"If someone in a command position is eliminated, who has not only real influence over ongoing military operations but also a high level of competence, it is a significant loss for the Russian side," notes Dr. Dariusz Materniak, a Polish expert on Eastern affairs. "It's important to remember that these are usually officers with long service time and substantial combat experience, from the war with Ukraine and other operations conducted by Russia. Replacing someone in a similar position with an equally competent individual is much more challenging because such people are usually scarce, even in an army as expansive as Russia's."

Especially since the Russian army has already suffered significant losses regarding senior officers at the level of colonel and above during the war with Ukraine, particularly in 2022, this has had and will continue to have a negative impact on Russian capabilities at operational and strategic levels, notes the expert.

The Russians face a serious shortage of command personnel. To date, over 4,300 officers of the Russian army, the National Guard, and other security forces have been confirmed dead. Among them, 467 held the rank of lieutenant colonel and above, including eight generals. Fifty-seven senior officers, including two generals, have died in just the past six months.

Dr. Michał Piekarski, a security expert from the University of Wrocław, Poland, highlights another important aspect.

"The psychological factor is extremely significant," he notes. "Ukraine has shown that it can reach Russian perpetrators even in the capital of the country. Secondly, the Russians will have to further strengthen the protection of their generals, their facilities in Moscow, and other parts of the country, thus sending people there who can't perform other tasks during that time."

Cmdr. Wiesław Goździewicz, a former NATO Joint Force Training Centre legal adviser specializing in the law of armed conflicts and legal aspects of military operations, shares a similar view.

"This contributes to spreading fear among the Russian 'elite' and also signifies a failure of Russian counterintelligence. However, a real impact on military operations could have been the elimination of, for example, the Chief of the General Staff or one of the operational front commanders, as we saw at the beginning of the aggression when Russian generals disregarded OPSEC and INFOSEC requirements, i.e., operational and information security, relatively easily allowing themselves to be 'located' by American intelligence," explains the officer.

"In this case, the Russians evidently drew conclusions, and we no longer observe such spectacular 'failures' on the front. It's different in the deep rear, where it's easier to fall under the illusion of security because they are 'at home.' Paradoxically, it's easier for Ukrainian special services to carry out such assassinations precisely in Russian territory's depth than in the front zone," he notes.

So far, in the deep rear, Ukrainians have eliminated Lt. Gen. Igor Kirillov and his aide, Maj. Ilya Polikarpov, Lt. Col. Pilot Dmitriy Golenko, and Lt. Cmdr. Stanislav Rzhitsky. The loss of Lt. Gen. Kirillov may be particularly painful. He was the commander of the Radiological, Chemical, and Biological Defense Troops of the Russian Federation and had already been censured for attacks using prohibited substances.

In early May, the U.S. State Department accused the Russian Federation of violating the prohibition on the use of chemical weapons. The use of chemical gas was "probably caused by the desire to displace Ukrainian forces from fortified positions and achieve tactical benefits on the battlefield," the State Department said in a statement.

In connection with Kirillov's death, the Investigative Committee of the Russian Federation initiated a criminal case under Russian Federation Criminal Code articles regarding terrorism, labeling Ukrainian actions as state terrorism. However, experts note that the categorization is more complex.

"Neither terrorism nor the elimination of criminals," explains Cmdr. Wiesław Goździewicz. "It is the elimination of enemy combatants using controversial methods. For them to be considered war criminals, they would have to be convicted. But Ukraine does not have the right to adjudicate or apply the death penalty, even in wartime, as it is a party to Optional Protocol XIII to the European Convention on Human Rights."

Dr. Piekarski, whose research area includes terrorism, concurs.

"This is not state terrorism," he emphasizes firmly. "The target was a soldier, although the method was unusual. During wartime, such actions are permissible, especially against high-ranking members of the opponent's armed forces."

Igor Kirillov was killed on December 17, 2024, in Moscow due to a bombing. The explosive device was hidden in an electric scooter in front of the building on Ryazansky Avenue where the general lived.

"The Times" called the assassination of the general "a legitimate act of defense." Dmitry Medvedev personally responded. The former president and prime minister of Russia, now deputy chairman of the Security Council, stated: "Be careful! Many things happen in London..."

The Russian Federal Security Service announced on December 18 that it had detained a suspect who allegedly carried out the attack. The FSB claims the alleged perpetrator is a 29-year-old Uzbek citizen. Russian media emphasize that the man was reportedly recruited by Ukrainian special services. He was supposed to receive $100,000 and a guarantee of residence in one of the European Union countries in exchange.

However, no evidence has been presented so far, and the speed of the FSB's actions has been regarded as astonishingly quick. Especially since they have fared poorly in previous cases, both in investigations after attacks and in counterintelligence protection. Ukrainian intelligence doesn't face much trouble identifying targets either.

"People in the highest command positions, playing an important role in the command system, are a high priority for the Ukrainian side," says Dr. Materniak.

Even before Lt. Col. Pilot Golenko was found dead in October in the village of Suponyevo near Bryansk, Ukrainians published a list of names and places of residence of regimental officers accused of terrorist attacks.

"In the case of officers, target identification is relatively easy, even based on open-source data. Personal data of high-ranking officers in prominent positions are often published officially, even despite ongoing war. The problem is more the selection of the place and time of the attack, as this requires tedious intelligence work, such as establishing behavior patterns, habits, and customary routes between home and service location," adds Cmdr. Wiesław Goździewicz.

"Much depends on the "assets" Ukrainian intelligence has in the given location, in the surroundings of this or that officer, but probably also on how aware such a person is of the threat and whether and what security measures they undertake," notes Dr. Materniak.

The complexity of intelligence work results in attacks on major officers not being very frequent.

"Preparations for such attacks must have taken many weeks, if not months, but here, too, in a way the victims of these attacks 'helped' Ukrainian services," concludes Cmdr. Wiesław Goździewicz. "Routine kills."