Ukraine's struggle: NATO hopes clash with U.S. caution. Interview

Tatiana Kolesnychenko: The year 2024 hasn't been favorable for Ukraine. It started with the fall of Avdiivka and ended with the occupation of Kurakhove. We've witnessed fortress cities in Donbas falling one after another. Now the Russians are two miles from Pokrovsk and five miles from the borders of the Dnipropetrovsk region. Is the Ukrainian front on the verge of collapse?

Frank Ledwidge, British military expert*: It's too early to talk about a collapse of the front. While we see the Russians making continuous progress—attacking with smaller forces but in aggressive, simultaneous directions—it's not over yet.

Kherson, Orikhiv, Velyka Novosilka, Toretsk, Chasiv Yar, Kupiansk, Kursk... The Russians are attacking almost along the entire front line, which stretches for 727 miles.

The situation isn't revolutionary, but Ukraine's main issue is the disparity in forces. The Russians have more personnel and equipment. Ukraine has struggled with a lack of missiles, tanks, and drones from the start. Now, the biggest problem is a shortage of personnel.

Kyiv might achieve tactical successes by attacking Russian logistics or at sea, but the war's center of gravity is on the eastern and southern fronts, where Ukraine faces significant pressure. It has strong, experienced brigades but needs to maneuver and redeploy them to different locations to fill in the gaps in a weakening defense. This allows them to stop Russian attacks, but not all at once.

But these brigades aren't eternal. The example of the 72nd Mechanized Brigade, which fought the decisive battle of Kyiv in 2022 and then defended Vuhledar in Donbas for two years, shows that two and a half years of fighting without rotation exhausts even the strongest units. In September, the brigade withdrew from Vuhledar due to a lack of personnel to defend their positions.

This raises concerns about the front's collapse. There's a risk that experienced units may start failing, potentially causing the front to break. However, I repeat: I don't think Ukraine is close to such a situation. There's a strong human factor here— the awareness of the necessity to defend the country, which, despite everything, maintains morale in the army.

There is a shortage of personnel at the front, and Ukraine clearly has a conscription problem. What should Kyiv do? Lower the conscription age to 18, as the Americans suggest?

The US argument is based on their experience during the Vietnam War when they lowered the conscription age to 18. But these comparisons are unfair because the US was in a completely different demographic situation. For Ukraine, such a step could endanger the country's future.

Is there a point of no return? Volodymyr Zelensky once said you might win a war but lose the country because no one will be left to rebuild it. And the generation aged 18-30, which would be most useful at the front, is currently the smallest in the social structure.

We touch on the delicate issue of the number of casualties in this war. Zelensky's office and the general staff maintain that Ukraine's losses are low compared to Russia's.

According to the latest official data, 43,000 Ukrainian soldiers have been killed since the invasion began, and 370,000 have been wounded. During this time, the Russians have lost nearly 800,000 in killed and wounded combined. If these numbers are accurate, mobilizing the 18-25 age range shouldn't cause significant demographic harm.

But if the actual number of casualties is much higher—and I believe it is—then avoiding mobilization is a very reasonable argument.

Why do you believe the number of casualties is higher? Open-source intelligence (OSINT) analysts report only slightly larger numbers.

In September 2024, data from the US Department of Defense leaked to the American press indicated that estimated losses on both sides amounted to one million [about 80,000 Ukrainian killed and 400,000 wounded and about 200,000 Russian killed and 400,000 wounded – ed.]. I've heard similar estimates unofficially from Ukrainians themselves. As the command says, the actual loss ratio isn't one to five or seven, but closer to one to two. You can't claim to have destroyed a quarter of a million Russian soldiers without acknowledging that you've lost over a hundred thousand of your own.

Returning to the question of lowering the conscription age—it's a strategic decision. Does Ukraine's future depend on demographics or the state's existence? These two issues now conflict. If we consider this war existential, then all hands on deck. But we must be aware that we risk destroying the demographic potential. England in 1915 could afford it, and even then, it felt the consequences for decades.

Ukraine may not cope with a large demographic shock, as it could destabilize the country for years. So I understand why Zelensky says "no" to mobilizing the young. We return to the first question about the risk of the front collapsing. Due to a lack of fresh forces, a moment may come when the Ukrainian army cannot function as a cohesive entity. Such events have happened in history.

There's a third option: arm the Ukrainian army with modern equipment, which would lower the number of casualties. As you stated in our previous conversation, the USA has thousands of pieces of military equipment they could give to Ukraine without reducing their combat potential. Instead, they expect Kyiv to compensate with manpower. So when Americans talk about lowering the conscription age, it smacks of hypocrisy, and in Ukraine, there's a growing belief that the West is using Ukrainians as cannon fodder to bleed Russia.

It's true; in this situation, the USA is being two-faced. Americans spend billions of dollars on aid to Ukraine, but most of that money stays in their own country. Military support has been significant but could have been much larger. Under Trump's administration, this might change. If Putin won't negotiate, support for Ukraine could significantly increase. The question is: who will operate those tanks, cannons, or missile systems? And even if Ukraine lowers the conscription age, how long will it take to train new people? This moment was lost at the beginning of the invasion.

Russia is taking advantage of its superiority, and contrary to analysts' predictions, hasn't slowed its offensive pace with the onset of winter. The heaviest fighting is in Donbas, but just before the end of the year, the Russians attempted to storm the right bank of the Dnieper near Kherson, sparking speculation that in 2025, the Kremlin might try to occupy the city again.

I don't think they seriously consider crossing the Dnieper. Given the fierce Ukrainian resistance, the Russians would have to deploy their main forces to capture Kherson, meaning they would have to withdraw from Donbas. They might try to create something reminiscent of Krynky [a village on the occupied left bank of the Dnieper that Ukraine captured and held for under a year - ed.] but won't achieve anything more. I think the real goal is to keep the Ukrainian forces in the region and prevent them from being transferred to other places on the front, where defense is weakening.

Ukraine attempted to use the same tactic in the Kursk region. It was one of Kyiv's few daring operations in 2024. But by opening another front, Ukraine weakened its defense in Donbas, and moreover, American officials believe it could be pushed out of Russia in the coming months. If that happens, will the Sumy region be threatened by invasion?

If it happens, it'll be many months from now. Ukrainians will fiercely defend the captured areas in the Kursk region as they do now, at the cost of other sections. In my opinion, the Kursk operation was militarily insignificant and very risky. In August 2024, when Ukraine started it, there was no serious threat to the Sumy region. Even if the Russians had some plans, the Ukrainian army would have been able to repel a minor attack. Now it'll be much harder because Russia gathered large forces in the region, which will continue the offensive and pursue the Ukrainians if they retreat.

For now, it's happening very slowly, which doesn't change the fact that it must be demoralizing for soldiers fighting in Toretsk or the Velyka Novosilka area. If I were in their place, I'd ask myself why Ukraine's strongest brigades defend uncertain interests in Russia instead of supporting the Donbas front?

I'd answer that they are trying to hold one strong card for Ukraine in case of negotiations with Russia.

I would argue the sense of this strategy. Ukraine controls less than 193 square miles of territory, which is nothing on Russia's scale. I understand that Ukrainian command wanted a breakthrough, but there lacked a clear goal, like capturing the Kursk nuclear power plant. Ukrainian forces turned out to be insufficient. Now they have to deal with the consequences. As long as the best brigades defend positions in Kursk, Russia occupied much larger areas in Donbas.

I know that many Ukrainian commanders share this view. Additionally, skepticism toward the Kursk operation was one of the reasons for the dismissal of Valerii Zaluzhnyi, the former Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces of Ukraine, now the ambassador to the UK.

He was conservative in his approach. If you are on the defensive, conducting a raid or attack for a specific objective can sometimes be beneficial, but occupying hundreds of square miles just to hold them is not.

Zaluzhnyi's dismissal was a shock for Ukraine, although after the counteroffensive's failure in 2023, it seemed a logical move. However, Zaluzhnyi still enjoys enormous trust, which can't be said for his successor, Gen. Oleksandr Syrskyi. But do their command styles differ significantly?

Syrskyi had a reputation for not caring about casualties. He was even nicknamed "General 200" [from "Cargo 200," once used to denote transport of fallen soldiers - ed.], which isn't true. Both Zaluzhnyi and Syrskyi cared about the soldiers. And likewise, both had no choice and could only rely on Soviet military tactics because the soldiers they led weren't trained to conduct operations according to NATO standards. In this sense, Syrskyi and Zaluzhnyi do not differ much, as they have limited capabilities due to poorly trained soldiers.

And arbitrary commanders? At the end of the year, Ukraine was rocked by a scandal. Drastic cases of abuse and extortion of bribes from soldiers of the 211th Bridge-Ponton Brigade were revealed. On one hand, Ukraine has examples of soldiers who rose from infantry to the highest positions and enjoy immense respect from their subordinates. But on the other hand, there is equally as much pathology, random people with great ambition who care more about their careers than the personnel composition. Can it be eradicated in the army?

It can be; I can draw from the example of Great Britain. During World War I, commanders were appointed based on origin, not skill. It backfired on us, resulting in enormous losses. But we learned the lesson: an approach based on constant aggression doesn't work. By World War II, we had commanders who advanced based on skills, and they were excellent.

The Germans had a different approach, creating a mission command system. As a result, they had good commanders throughout World War II. It boiled down to everyone understanding, regardless of being a cook or rifleman, how the war should be fought, the goal, their place, and mission. The system was ingrained in everyone to the extent that if, say, the battalion command was lost, a sergeant could take command.

In the Ukrainian army, there is no mission command institution, and soldiers don't always understand the command's goals. The post-Soviet approach still dominates: you receive an order and designated resources, and the command expects you to execute it to the letter. A modern army doesn't work like that. We get an order to capture a village, for instance, but we plan how to do it and what we need. This mindset can be changed, but it requires training, much training, and time, creating a command structure at every level and trust. But this is also Russia's problem.

In 2022, we laughed at the foolishness of the Russians, but three years later, they are succeeding on the front, and it's not always just due to their numerical advantage.

It's due to their ability to learn from mistakes. Again, I'll use a historical example. In 1939, Russia invaded Finland. They wanted to change the government and subjugate the country. They had a significant numerical advantage but failed. The Finns bravely defended their land and retained sovereignty.

People laughed at the foolish Russians, throwing their soldiers like cannon fodder, without winter uniforms, weapons, and proper artillery. They felt so confident that in 1941, they decided to attack Russia with Germany to regain lands annexed during the Winter War. But the Russians did their homework and quickly defeated Finland. That's why Karelia is now part of Russia, not Finland.

Russians can learn, and I said this at the very beginning of the invasion: we should be cautious because they will learn to fight. They adopted many German military techniques and additionally do not care about casualties. During the battles for Bakhmut, they easily sacrificed 40,000 people. But now they've realized they can conduct maneuver warfare, use small units, and quick attacks to destabilize Ukrainian defenses. And I know that Ukrainian soldiers are well aware of this; the Ukrainian command knows it, but we are still stuck in the belief of "foolish Russians."

How long will Russia be able to maintain the current pace of the offensive?

I'll say something unpleasant, but in a war of attrition, Russia will probably endure longer than Ukraine. They just have more resources. They have a better demographic situation and are ready to bear any costs to capture any town or village in Donbas.

Do you mean to say it's not worth counting on a collapse or rebellion in Russia?

It's extremely unlikely, even though we've been living with this hope for almost three years.

I was in Ukraine when Prigozhin's coup happened; everyone thought a revolution was coming. But it didn't happen and won't.

Russia has resources, advances on the front, and all Kremlin communication boils down to the main goal - capture all of Ukraine - remains unchanged. In these conditions, negotiations, which everyone hopes for, seem unlikely. So will 2025 not bring change?

I don't have a crystal ball, but it seems that the chances of a breakthrough are slim. Russians wish to occupy at least four Ukrainian oblasts - Donetsk, Luhansk, Kherson, and Zaporizhzhia to create an imaginary Novorossiya, and they will strive for that.

Or the Russians are bluffing, blackmailing the West to pressure Ukraine in the matter of territorial concessions.

Of course, they are playing us. Maybe they are willing to negotiate because they bear very high war costs. But I wouldn't underestimate Donald Trump's negotiation skills; he is very firm and tough in that regard.

Again, I will say something unpopular, but hundreds of Ukrainians die every day, and there is still no real prospect of winning the war. Kyiv, even after losing territories, can still emerge victoriously from this war by maintaining sovereignty, a functioning state, and access to the Black Sea. These are the basics. After the war ends, Ukraine will be a military power in Europe with the most experienced army on the continent. But first, it must stop, sum up, and utilize its knowledge.

The key is realism. There won't be a liberation of Crimea or Donetsk, nor will there be an invitation to NATO. This is the political reality. Russians will not accept Ukraine in NATO, so they will continue the war, which the USA does not want, and thus will seek compromise.

You say the Ukrainian army will be the strongest on the continent, which considers Russia the biggest threat. Where is the logic when we let Russia veto who to invite to the Alliance?

If the decision regarding membership belonged to the UK or France, Ukraine would already be in the Alliance. But the USA won't take that risk, not under Trump's administration. He won't confront Russia. And for the Kremlin, there's only one red line: Ukraine in NATO. That's also why we won't see large peacekeeping forces in Ukraine.

Is it because of that? France and Germany have already expressed readiness to send peacekeeping forces.

Firstly, Russia won't agree to it, as it would mean NATO states would have to establish military bases on Ukrainian territory. Secondly, the Americans will not engage in a peacekeeping mission, and Europe doesn't have those forces. It's easy to count. How many people would it take to control the entire front line?

The most modest estimates say 100,000.

I was on a UN peacekeeping mission in Bosnia. The European contingent numbered about 40,000 soldiers. It was 1995, and Europe's armed forces were three times larger back then. Today, with a very large effort, the EU could send about 20,000 soldiers, of which about seven thousand would be British and around 10,000 French.

It's not just about sending people but also logistics, rotations, equipment maintenance. And maybe Europe would decide on it if it had a guarantee from the United States. As I've said, Trump doesn't want to risk conflict with Russia.

In fact, this means that Russia will come out of the war with the conviction that force can be used to enforce anything. They can commit war crimes en masse, invade neighbors, and nothing. So Ukraine, Poland, and the Baltic countries will still have a 140-million-strong country dreaming of reviving its empire and ready to accept any violence on their borders.

Russia is aggressive and wants to attack Europe, but at the same time, this large country hasn't been able to capture Pokrovsk, a peripheral town in Donbas, for half a year. How should they attack NATO countries? I am very skeptical when I hear about the threat to the Baltic countries. Every year, the US National Intelligence Council publishes a report compiled by 17 intelligence agencies. Last year, Americans concluded that Putin does not want war with NATO.

Ukraine needs a realistic strategy, not dreams of NATO. Bilateral security guarantees with individual countries and consistently building its armed forces can be equally effective. Ukraine has already achieved the most important thing - the independence of its country and can still have a great future, rebuild its economy, continue integration with the EU. That's the strategy.

Tatiana Kolesnychenko is a journalist for Wirtualna Polska

Frank Ledwidge - graduated in law from Oxford University and received a Ph.D. in war studies from King's College London. He served as a British Army officer for 15 years, serving in the Balkans, Iraq, and Afghanistan. After leaving the military, he became a civilian advisor to the British government, including on Afghanistan and Libya. He currently lectures at one of the UK's largest military bases - RAF Halton. Ledwidge is the author of several books, including "Losing Small Wars" and "Aerial Warfare: A Very Short Introduction".