Ukrainians revive strategy: Targeting Russian command hubs
Ukrainians are targeting not only individual officers. They are once again employing a tactic that proved highly effective at the beginning of the war. Their targets are now Russian command staff.
Since the beginning of the year, Ukrainians have resumed attacks on Russian command centers. On January 2, rocket missiles struck the command post of a marine brigade in the village of Maryino in the Kursk region. A few days later, the Ukrainian General Staff reported attacks on the command posts of the 8th Combined Arms Army in occupied Khartsyzk in the Donetsk region and the subordinate 3rd Army Corps in occupied Svitlodarsk in the Donetsk region. On January 12, missiles reportedly targeted the staff of the 2nd Combined Arms Army.
The command of the 2nd Army is currently directing Russian operations south of Pokrovsk; the 3rd Corps is operating near Chasiv Yar, and the 8th Army is engaged near Kurakhove. All these commands are responsible for actions in the most critical sectors in recent months. Approximately 70 percent of all combat engagements occur along the entire front line, which spans over 930 miles.
The Ukrainians have returned to a tactic used during the first year of the war when neutralizing command centers and staffs confused the Russian army. Those attacks managed to cut off units fighting near Izyum during the recovery of the Kharkiv region.
Decapitating the Hydra
Three years ago, Ukrainians effectively paralyzed the command system, increasing the chaos within the opponent's army. The significant impact of eliminating senior officers for defensive warfare was evident in the Polessian sector, where Ukrainians completely dismantled the battalion tactical groups led by colonels. Their deaths caused the offensive to halt entirely. Serious problems arose after eliminating staff in the Izyum and Kherson sectors, especially during attacks on Chornobaivka.
The Kherson airport was attacked at least 18 times. This always happened when supply helicopters or command staff arrived there. In the initial stage of the war, the Russians did not learn from this. On March 18, 2022, Lt. Gen. Andrei Mordvichev, commander of the 8th Guards Combined Arms Army, was injured in an attack on the airport. On March 25, Lt. Gen. Yakov Rezantsev, commander of the 49th Combined Arms Army, was killed in a rocket artillery barrage at the airport, along with two colonels.
The death of Major Gen. Vladimir Frolov, the deputy commander of the 8th Guards Combined Arms Army, was a significant loss, having been eliminated by a sniper in the spring of 2022—on March 10, according to reports. Ukrainians intercepted information that the general would visit a brigade command post. A timely strike was merely a detail, finalizing the collaboration of several elements of the whole system.
However, the most severe loss was the death of Major Gen. Andrei Kolesnikov, the commander of the 29th Combined Arms Army of the Eastern Military District. According to unconfirmed reports, he was killed on March 11, a day after Frolov's death, during a strike on the command post where he was present.
All these strikes significantly impeded Russian advances on the front. Most often, troops deprived of orders from above would halt. Lower-level commanders could not demonstrate initiative and awaited directives, and when these did not appear, they preferred not to take risks.
Reapplying methods from the start of the war now could yield even better results. While the Lernaean Hydra would grow two or three equally strong heads in place of each severed one, in the case of the Russian Hydra, only one regrows, which doesn't necessarily mean it will be as competent. It is often poorer, so hunting command posts pays off greatly for Ukrainians. Moreover, they reinforce the notion that Russians cannot feel safe anywhere.
Target hunting
Electronic warfare forces inspire in locating command posts and staff. They intercept signals from Russian communications and locate their source. This is made easier by the persistent issue Russians have had for years with communications, which either function very poorly or not at all. This problem exists at every level, from individual soldier equipment to the strategic level.
It's hard to believe, but Russians often use unencrypted Chinese-made walkie-talkies, the kind you can buy in stores. Meanwhile, the Azart radios they spent $240 million on in 2012 are incompatible with market products.
The weakness of Russian electronic warfare systems is best exemplified by the death of Major Gen. Andrei Simonov, commander of the Electronic Warfare Units of the 2nd Guards Combined Arms Army. He was killed on April 29 or 30, 2022, near Izyum due to a rocket artillery attack on the army command post. His units were supposed to ensure the security of communication means. They did not perform well.
