US Air Force's billion-dollar battle: The future of air dominance

The primary air superiority aircraft of the United States Air Force remains the F-15 Eagle. It is a continuously modernized machine but originates from the 1970s. For this reason, even in its latest F-15EX variant, it does not provide many functionalities of the so-called fifth-generation aircraft. Most importantly, it is not a stealth aircraft.

This issue was already identified in the 1980s. Within the ATF program, the much more modern F-22 Raptor was developed, offering, among other things, safer mission execution due to its stealth characteristics, greater cruising speed including "supercruise," and extremely high maneuverability. Unfortunately, due to budget cuts, the USAF purchased only 187 of these aircraft instead of the planned 750, so the modernized, now multi-role but not new F-15, still had to remain a sort of "workhorse."

Meanwhile, new technologies have emerged: drones, early versions of artificial intelligence, and increasingly powerful radars. To maintain an edge over the competition, the USA demanded a new machine: the NGAD.

The NGAD program, initiated in 2014 under the designation IDI, was intended to result in an entirely new aircraft. In fact, the goal was to develop an entire air combat system. The concept of the aircraft evolved over time; initially, a "better Raptor" was anticipated, then came the philosophy of a "new series of the century," and eventually, two different combat aircraft—a larger, longer-range one for the Pacific theater and a smaller one for European combat.

Eventually, it settled on an extremely advanced, relatively large aircraft with long range, advanced sensors, stealth solutions, and innovative engines. The most important feature of the NGAD, however, is not its design but its ability to incorporate many stealth solutions and even optional unmanned capabilities due to the implementation of artificial intelligence algorithms.

The NGAD was meant to be the core of an entire air combat system, which would include optionally manned heavy machines and several types of accompanying drones. These drones would enhance the capabilities of the combat aircraft by carrying additional sensors, electronic warfare systems, and armaments, further increasing the safety of the pilot and the expensive—estimated at up to $300 million each—manned machine.

To date, at least three different test machines have been flown, but their photos are not available, nor are details about what exactly was tested. It all comes down to costs.

On January 13, 2025, USAF Secretary Frank Kendall stated that the research and development phase of the NGAD program, excluding the separately developed CCA program for accompanying unmanned machines, was expected to cost around $20 billion. Knowing the tendency to exceed budgets, it would likely be much more.

The aircraft itself was estimated, as mentioned above, to cost approximately $300 million, with the purchase of about 200 machines. For comparison, the F-35A costs the American taxpayer about $100 million, while the new generation heavy bomber B-21 Raider is expected to cost about $500 million each.

Therefore, it is no surprise that a few months ago, the program was halted to verify certain assumptions, determine the rationale for the projected costs, and verify the planned efficiency of the machines. The election period certainly didn't help; the decision on the future of NGAD is to be made by the new administration. Although it will take office on January 20, right after the elections, one of its most influential representatives expressed very strong opinions about the USAF's concepts.

In November, Elon Musk, a billionaire, owner of several technology companies, and recently an avid gamer, stated that the future of aviation belongs exclusively to drones, even calling buyers of multi-purpose fifth-generation F-35 aircraft idiots.

Given his close cooperation with President-elect Donald Trump and the anticipated significant role of Musk in the future U.S. administration, these words sparked lively discussion. Most of the expert community received this statement very critically. Kendall himself was diplomatic with Musk, emphasizing his respect for Musk's engineering and business achievements but pointed out that he is not a "warfighter" and should learn more about this business before making such statements.

Indeed, in the whole NGAD concept (and other concepts of "future air combat systems," such as FCAS/SCAF, GCAP), drones are to play a very large but not leading role. The air forces of most countries still claim that humans are needed near the "front lines" to supervise the fight. Of course, the future co-chair of the Government Efficiency Department (a Trump-predicted oversight body) will try to influence changes in USAF plans, but how successful will he be?

Given financial problems, the NGAD program may indeed undergo a thorough redesign. During Monday's (January 13) speech, Kendall proposed several different options.

One solution would be a smaller and cheaper aircraft, which, according to the USAF Secretary, would be rather "something like a successor to the F-35." It would serve not so much for independent combat in cooperation with unmanned machines as for managing them. It could even be an appropriately adapted F-35. The key to success would be to reduce the armament weight in favor of increasing fuel reserves, alongside modernizing avionics.

The reverse approach is also possible: since the B-21 Raider is relatively inexpensive, is already being produced, and is a known machine, and the NGAD was going to be a large and heavy aircraft anyway, maybe the strategic bomber could be an air superiority platform? USAF Chief of Staff Gen. David Allvin, in October 2024, indicated that the bomber could perform some air combat functions, especially in managing unmanned aircraft, serving as a server for them, etc.

It could also perform another, more classic function. According to USAF, one of the alternatives to the efforts to build a successor to the F-22 and F-15 could be focusing on developing capabilities for strikes behind enemy lines, including air bases. Eliminating aircraft on the ground is even safer than air combat.

In this case, the B-21 would simply carry cruise missiles (from the JASSM family, but also strategic LRSO), supporting the USAF's efforts to achieve air dominance. Interestingly, the B-21 is projected to optionally carry air-to-air missiles. Thus, instead of a large and expensive air superiority aircraft, the USAF could potentially receive an even larger and more expensive one.

In any case, no resignation from manned aircraft is expected in the near future. The problem remains with the entire future model of air dominance according to the USAF. It is currently known that it will be implemented using a mix of manned and unmanned machines. But which ones? This largely depends on the funds the Pentagon can expect under the new administration, the verification of the NGAD program's assumptions, and which lobbyists will gain the upper hand.

Deputy Secretary Andrew Hunter seems to argue for the continuation of NGAD, pointing out in one of the recent interviews that while the USAF's advantage over its Chinese competitor is currently significant, the competitor's progress is rapid, and it is not out of the question that the Chinese could achieve some capabilities sooner. What Trump will do about it? The near future will tell.